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TAX ADVICE BEFORE THE RETURN: THE
CASE FOR RAISING STANDARDS AND
DENYING EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES
Linda M. Beale*
Abusive tax shelters have shone an unappealing light on tax
lawyers. Some commentators suggest that these abusive shelters are the
work of a small tax shelter bar. This article argues that the same
practitioner norms, interpretive approaches, and tax standards that
make possible the role of the so-called tax shelter bar in designing mass-
marketed shelters also encourage aggressive loophole exploitation in
customized tax planning by the regular tax bar.
Recent changes have set the stage for a paradigm shift in tax
compliance. A new reportable transaction regime increases
transparency. The 2004 Jobs Act's stiffer penalties and heightened
standards for penalty protection, at least in the context of reportable
transactions that have a significant tax avoidance purpose, move the
target towards better compliance. Significant changes to the rules
governing practice before the Internal Revenue Service add momentum.
This article argues that the best way to stymie socially wasteful tax
planning is to accelerate the paradigm shift. The statutory and ethical
standards for positions taken or advised on returns should be raised. A
taxpayer should not be able to take a position on a tax return, nor an
advisor advise a position, unless it is considered to have a greater than
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fifty percent likelihood of success on the merits if litigated. To make
returns fully transparent and facilitate enforcement, Congress should
amend the law to eliminate the applicability to pre-return tax planning
advice of the common law attorney-client privilege and work product
protection.
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Tax Advice Before the Return
[T]he tax law is exceedingly complex and open to alternative
interpretations, and this undoubtedly facilitates ethical
rationalizations of positions taken. But how far this is pushed
depends on a willingness to aggressively seek out alternative
interpretations and innovative legal forms that take advantage
of gaps in the law, and the unanticipated effects of combining
parts of the law.'
The tax bar is the repository of the greatest ingenuity in
2America, and given the chance, those people will do you in.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, abusive tax shelters and customized tax planning have
shone a particularly unappealing light on lawyers who single-mindedly
pursue their clients' tax-reduction goals. Prominent firms have
received summonses or have been sued by the Internal Revenue
Service (Service) or by their clients regarding transactions with
significant tax avoidance purposes.3 Instead of "pillars of our system
of taxation," they have become "architects of its circumvention."
4
1 Joel Slemrod, The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness, 57 NAT'L TAX J.
877,884 (2004).
2 Legislation Relating to Tax-Motivated Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, 97th Cong. 90 (1982) (statement of Martin D. Ginsburg, Professor of Law,
Georgetown Univ. Law Center).
3 See, e.g., Pamela A. MacLean, Sidley Austin Sued on Tax Shelters: Venture
Capitalist Dixon R. Doll Is Newest Plaintiff, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 4, 2005, at 4 (noting a
former client's suit against Sidley Austin Brown & Wood and its former partner R.J.
Ruble over their advice regarding a tax shelter intended to produce losses through
investments in nonperforming loans); Susan Simmonds, Shelter Cases Highlight
Uncertain Outcomes, 106 TAX NOTES 45 (Jan. 3, 2005) (providing an overview of
shelter litigation, summons enforcement, and civil suits); Lynnley Browning,
Executive Files Suit Over a Tax Shelter, QUATLOOS!: SCAMS & FRAUDS EXPOSED,
Mar. 23, 2004, available at http://www.quatloos.com/executive_sues_tax-shelter.htm
(reporting suit against LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae regarding tax shelter);
Lynnley Browning, Filing Says Bogus Tax Shelters Sold to 1,100, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
2004, at C2 (discussing Jenkens & Gilchrist's resistance to summonses and its
settlement of a class action suit over opinion letters "cost[ing] up to millions of dollars
apiece").
4 Albert B. Crenshaw, Nominee to Head IRS Vows to Strengthen Enforcement,
WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2003, at A4 (quoting Commissioner Mark W. Everson at
2006]
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The government's answer to abusive tax transactions has been
greater transparency, tougher sanctions, and more vigorous
enforcement, as evidenced by the development of corporate tax
shelter regulations governing potentially abusive reportable
5 6transactions. Ferreting out abuse requires continuing that effort.
Enforcement will not succeed, however, if it focuses solely on
defeating cloned tax shelters.7  Congress and the Treasury
Department (Treasury) must solve loophole-exploiting
noncompliance of the kind that shows up as easily in customized tax
8planning for a particular client as in mass-marketed tax shelters.
This requires a shift in the treatment of tax planning. Tax advice
covers a wide spectrum - from tax structuring applying unambiguous
provisions to minimize taxes on ordinary business deals to potentially
abusive structures that are hawked to high-paying customers to offset
pre-existing gains. Compliance discussions have focused almost
exclusively on the latter.9 This overlooks the inappropriateness of
potentially abusive tax planning in customized deals with significant
tax avoidance objectives. The same practitioner norms, interpretive
approaches, and tax standards that enable the tax shelter bar to design
cloned shelters also encourage aggressive loophole exploitation in
Senate Finance Committee hearing).
5 See infra Part II.C.1.
6 See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, Putting SEC Heat on Audit Firms and Corporate
Tax Shelters: Responding to Tax Risk with Sunshine, Shame and Strict Liability, 29 J.
CORP. L. 219 (2004) [hereinafter Beale, SEC Heat]; Linda M. Beale, Law Professor
Offers Suggestions for Fighting Shelters, 103 TAX NoTEs 125 (Apr. 5, 2004) (Letter
from Linda M. Beale, Ass't Prof., Univ. of Ill. College of Law, to Sen. Paul Sarbanes
and George Yin, Chief of Staff, J. Comm. on Tax'n (Feb. 18, 2004)); Jonathan G.
Katz, Tax Profs Urged SEC to Take Tough Stance on Auditor Independence, 98 TAX
NoTEs 765 (Feb. 3, 2003) (Letter from Linda M. Beale, Ass't Prof., Univ. of Ill.
College of Law, et al., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n (Jan. 10,
2003)).
7 This term is used for abusive structures that can be duplicated and marketed
to multiple clients. Some shelters have even been patented. Rachel Emma
Silverman, The Patented Tax Shelter- Lawyers, Financial Advisers Are Getting
Exclusive Rights to Estate-Planning Strategies, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2004, at D1.
8 This is supported by tax practitioners' arguments against regulatory and
statutory developments on the grounds that "one cannot tell a tax shelter transaction
from respectable 'aggressive tax planning."' Lee A. Sheppard, Corporate Shelters: A
Snowball's Chance of Pretax Profit, 88 TAX NOTES 728, 728 (Aug. 7, 2000) (describing
N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section arguments against shelter legislation).
9 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 109-54, at 5-6 (2005) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]
(noting that abusive shelters and overreaching customized planning can be harmful,
but focusing on the former).
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customized tax planning by the regular tax bar.' °
Almost any prominent case of abusive tax structuring
demonstrates the use of hyper-literal interpretations to achieve a tax
goal that is at odds with the underlying purpose of applicable
provisions. In the case of the (infamous) Merrill Lynch partnerships,
the use of installment rules in a partnership with a foreign
accommodation party generated an artificial loss.1 The contingent
liability shelter exposed in the Enron bankruptcy and now being
litigated likewise disregarded statutory purpose to capture an artificial
loss. 12  Two other recent transactions manipulated the partnership
allocation rules in the context of a foreign accommodation party to
generate a taxpayer benefit - Long Term Capital Holdings' loss-
duplicating structure (adjudicated to be a tax shelter) 3 and GE
10 See infra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing commentators'
categorization of tax lawyers as belonging to one or the other approach).
1 ACM P'ship v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998) (applying economic
substance to eliminate losses attributable to installment sale ratable basis recovery
rule). The Merrill Lynch shelters used the contingent debt installment sale and
partnership allocation rules to generate a noneconomic tax loss. See, e.g., Boca
Investerings P'ship v. United States, 314 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (reversing district
court recognition of purported partnership between taxpayer and foreign bank); ASA
Investerings P'ship v. Commissioner, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming Tax
Court decision disregarding purported partnership between AlliedSignal and foreign
bank); Saba P'ship v. Commissioner, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 817 (2003) (disregarding
purported partnership between U.S. corporation and foreign bank because there was
no nontax business purpose).
12 See, e.g., Karen C. Burke, Deconstructing Black & Decker's Contingent
Liability Shelter: A Statutory Analysis, 108 TAx NOTEs 211 (July 11, 2005) (describing
artificial loss structure using corporate formation excess debt rules with debt
supported by parent guarantees as disregarding congressional purpose to support
transfers of trade or business).
13 Long Term Capital Holdings involved two sequential transactions designed by
investment bank Babcock & Brown to produce artificial tax losses at both stages: (i) a
lease-stripping deal that took advantage of U.S. and U.K. tax rules to avoid taxation
of arranged prepayments and U.S. corporate formation rules to provide deductions
out of untaxed income to a U.S. corporate shelter client, and (ii) a tiered partnership
deal that purportedly permitted the top-tier partners to benefit from a transitory
partner's contribution of inflated basis stock from the lease-stripping deal, with a
partnership sale of the stock resulting in allocation of an artificial loss to the
sheltering partners. Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d
122 (D. Conn. 2004), affd, 150 F. App'x 40 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Alvin C. Warren,
Jr., Understanding Long Term Capital, 106 TAX NoTEs 681 (Feb. 7, 2005) (analyzing
transaction and decision in depth). Section 704(c)(1)(C), which does not permit a
pre-contribution loss to be allocated to other partners after the contributing partner
leaves a partnership, was enacted after the transactions took place. Id. at 686 n.26.
2006]
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Capital's Castle Harbour financing transaction (upheld as a
partnership)." These latter two cases ably illustrate the artificiality of
the shelter/nonshelter categorization. Castle Harbour was a
customized tax deal designed to suit GE Capital Corporation's
particular situation as owner of depreciated assets, while the Long
Term Capital Holdings structure was marketed to the hedge fund,
among others, as a capital gains eliminator. Similar manipulation of
Code loopholes is evident in recent real estate mortgage investment
conduit (REMIC) developments. REMIC lawyers reinterpreted a
straightforward provision (designed to accommodate credit
" Castle Harbour was a securitization transaction of older leased airplanes that
the General Electric group of affiliated corporations (referred to indiscriminately as
GE) implemented with two Dutch banks through a partnership structure that utilized
partnership rules effectively to provide GE with "refreshed" depreciation deductions
that deferred inclusion of most lease income for the term of the deal. TIFD III-E Inc.
v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 2004). The Dutch banks provided
about 22% of the assets but were allocated 98% of the operating income, and annual
distributions were scheduled to repay the investment at a 9.03587% or 8.53587%
return, depending upon whether the partnership terminated at or prior to its expected
eight-year term. The banks were assured of receiving repayment at the agreed return
by means of a separate investment account ledger. GE guaranteed scheduled annual
distributions to the bank, and an amount equal to the bank's investment was kept
invested in GE's commercial paper as collateral. The banks treated their investment
as a loan for internal purposes. The partnership should be viewed as a sham and the
arrangement as a contingent loan at 9.03587% (minus the return representing the
banks' accommodation fees). The banks lent money to GE by the roundabout
partnership structure that accommodated GE's tax deferral objective. In return, they
received a premium rate compared to the lower rate the banks would have received
for investing directly in GE's commercial paper. Id. at 98-100. The excess return can
be viewed as their fees for accommodating GE's tax avoidance objectives. See ASA
Investerings P'ship, 201 F.3d at 513-15 (holding that foreign bank accommodation
party with guaranteed return was not partner); Karen C. Burke, Castle Harbour:
Economic Substance and the Overall-Tax-Effect Test, 107 TAx NOTES 1163, 1172
(May 30, 2005) (emphasizing importance of banks' guaranteed minimum return);
Darryll K. Jones, Castle Harbour and the Hobgoblins of Little Minds, 106 TAx NOTES
605, 606 (Jan. 31, 2005) (noting court's circular reasoning in accepting GE's
partnership argument); Richard M. Lipton & Jenny A. Austin, Lessons from Castle
Harbour: The Service Loses a Significant Tax Shelter Case, 102 J. TAX'N 32 (2005)
(explaining depreciation and deferral); Lee A. Sheppard, Bury Your Tax Shelter in a
Business, 106 TAX NOTES 20 (Jan. 3, 2005) (analyzing structure). But see Robert H.
Scarborough, Partnerships as an Alternative to Secured Loans, 58 TAX LAW. 509
(2005) (arguing that sufficient equity characteristics permit taxpayers to structure
financings as partnerships, even without business purpose for partnership, but
providing little analysis of relevance of contingent and variable debt regulations to tax
characterization or of participating bank's financing (rather than investment)
purpose).
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enhancement to compensate for default losses in mortgage
securitizations) to provide technical cover for an engineered type of
shortfall that permits investment classes with maturity dates unrelated
to mortgage terms. The reinterpretation enabled REMIC sponsors to
create a new type of guaranteed maturity class (GMC) security
desired by investors.1
15 In broad terms, the REMIC rules create a passive statutory vehicle for issuing
interests (in addition to an ownership residual) that are backed by principal and
interest payments on qualified mortgage loans and given statutory characterization as
debt for tax purposes. I.R.C. §§ 860A-860G; Treas. Reg. § 1.860A-1 et seq. (2005). If
a REMIC complies with the restrictive rules for types of assets permitted to be held,
interests permitted to be issued and activities permitted to be undertaken, it is not
subject to tax. I.R.C. § 860A. If not, there may be confiscatory REMIC-level taxes
on prohibited transactions and/or failure of REMIC status resulting in taxation as a
corporation. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 860F. In 2000, Freddie Mac's description of its new
GMC securities explained that a REMIC would hold an option permitting it to put its
mortgage loans to Freddie Mac for payment sufficient to pay off related GMC
securities, even if the amount exceeded actual market price of the loans. OFFERING
CIRCULAR SUPPLEMENT (To OFFERING CIRCULAR DATED JAN. 1, 2000), FREDDIE
MAC MULTICLASS CERTIFICATES SERIES 2272, FREDDIE MAC'S SECURITIES SALES &
TRADING GROUP S-21 to S-22 (2000), http://freddiemac.com/mbs/data/2272oc.pdf.
Later disclosure merely described Freddie Mac's obligation to purchase without
mentioning a put right as a REMIC asset. OFFERING CIRCULAR SUPPLEMENT (To
OFFERING CIRCULAR DATED JAN. 1, 2000), FREDDIE MAC MULTICLASS
CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2301, UBS WARBURG S-47 (2001), http://freddiemac.com/mbs/
data/2301oc.pdf. Freddie Mac has recently announced a commitment to issue $2
billion of GMC securities annually, with set maturities of three to twelve years. See
Freddie Mac, Focus on: Reference REMIC Securities (Apr. 2005) (describing
introduction of regular GMC offerings), http://www.freddiemac.com/mbs/docs/remic-
factsht033005.pdf. These structures raise questions about REMIC status, since the
put with shortfall guarantee is likely an impermissible REMIC asset (and may be an
impermissible interest). One commentary suggests, without detailed analysis, that the
put with shortfall guarantee can be viewed as a credit enhancement contract incident
to related mortgage loans. JAMES M. PEASLEE & DAVID Z. NIRENBERG, THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF SECURITIZATION TRANSACTIONS 403 (2001 & Online
Supp.). This analysis is a significant stretch for a provision explicitly covering only
default losses, lower-than-expected returns on cash flow investments, or unanticipated
losses or expenses incurred by a REMIC. The shortfall at maturity is clearly neither a
default loss nor a low investment return - it arises because of the need to convert
mortgages to cash to repay GMC securities in full at an engineered maturity date that
may occur at a time when market conditions have caused loan prices to decline. Such
shortfalls can be expected to occur with some probability in any GMC deal. Because
the shortfall is a potential cost built into the structure of a REMIC that includes GMC
securities, it seems a stretch to consider a shortfall guarantee as covering an
"unanticipated" loss of the REMIC (even if the shortfall itself should be viewed as a
"loss," which is questionable). Guarantee payments can be expected to increase
when mortgage prepayments slow, generally when interest rates rise. Thus, there
Virginia Tax Review
Much of this aggressive tax planning traces to an interpretive
approach that encourages attorneys to view the Internal Revenue
Code (Code) as a tool box of provisions that can be taken out of
context by using literalist interpretations to achieve tax minimization
goals.16  Among other failings, these aggressive tax interpretations
disregard normatively important concepts critical to the function of
the tax system - the endogenous principles of structural coherence
and self-assessment, as well as the broader normative principle of
distributive justice. Structural coherence requires practitioners to
approach the Code with a view to its integrity as a coherent whole, to
the extent possible, with faithfulness not only to the superficial text
but also to the underlying purpose of Code provisions." Literalist
appears to be a strong argument that the put with shortfall guarantee required for
GMC securities would cause a GMC REMIC deal to fail REMIC status and be
subject to taxation. It appears that the tax bar advising on these deals has rationalized
the shortfall guarantee as credit enhancement, likely by accepting the literalist
argument that the payments are "unanticipated" as long as there is a sufficiently low
probability of payout as agreed among the REMIC bar. Even assuming this approach
were viable, maintaining such a low probability of payout would be difficult with large
issuances such as Freddie Mac's $2 billion annual output, where product requirements
could lead to pressure to accept higher probabilities of payout under the guarantee.
16 See, e.g., Peter C. Canellos, How to Curb Aggressive Shelter Activity, 105 TAX
NOTES 1156 (Nov. 22, 2004) ("[A]ggressive planners and their tax-adverse clientele
will always find and exploit loopholes."); Glenn E. Coven, What Corporate Tax
Shelters Can Teach Us About the Structure of Subchapter C, 105 TAX NOTES 831 (Nov.
8, 2004) (describing shelters as "a logical, if extreme, application of well established
rules" where advisors "ferret[] out" gaps).
17 See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, Book-Tax Conformity and the Corporate Tax Shelter
Debate: Assessing the Proposed Section 475 Mark-to-Market Safe Harbor, 24 VA. TAX
REV. 301, 359-70 (2004) (discussing coherence-reinforcing interpretation as
considering tax system as a whole and purpose for particular provision in light of
discoverable "overarching principles"); James Boyd White, Schooling Expectations,
54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 499, 500 (2004) (stating that attorneys should construe text "as a
coherent whole"); see also Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and
Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2004) (noting problems of literalist approach
disregarding statutory purpose); Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The
Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 492 (1995) (arguing for purposive approach based
on similar structural concept); Deborah A. Geier, Textualism and Tax Cases, 66
TEMP. L. REV. 445 (1993) (same); Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral
Interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C. L. REV. 623 (1986) (same); cf.
Michael Rosensaft, The Role of Purposivism in the Delegation of Rulemaking Power
to the Courts, 29 VT. L. REV. 611, 611 (2005) ("[Tlhe purpose of the statute may be all
that the legislators could agree on."). See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994) (emphasizing pragmatic interpretive
approach that acknowledges text, legislative history, and norms); Michael C. Dorf,
The Coherentism of Democracy and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1237 (2005) (supporting
[Vol. 25:583590
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interpretations that set aside statutory, legislative or historical
contexts that establish the reason for the provision fail to satisfy the
coherence requirement.1
8
The self-assessment criterion derives from the Code's "rel[iance]
on taxpayers to come clean about their taxable income, not to hide or
understate it."' 9  Self-assessment and its implied anti-manipulation
coherentist approach based on representation reinforcement); Cass R. Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989) (arguing
that pragmatic approach facilitates modern administrative state).
A number of tax commentators argue against purposivism in the context of the
courts' use of the judicial doctrine of substance-over-form (or one of its more narrow
derivatives such as economic substance) to override what are claimed to be "literal"
statutory meanings. See, e.g., John F. Coverdale, Text as Limit: A Plea for a Decent
Respect for the Tax Code, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1501 (1997) (arguing for textualist
approach). Even some commentators who view "pure literalism [-] words shorn of
all context" as problematic argue that purposivism merely permits interpreters to
assert their "own tastes." Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in
Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 864, 879 (1982).
The principle most generally offered in substitute for both (internal) coherence
and (external) distributive justice (discussed below in the text) is economic rationality
(efficiency). See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Business Purpose Doctrine and the
Sociology of Tax, 54 SMU L. REV. 149 (2001) (analyzing judicial doctrines from
economic perspective); David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax-
Avoidance Doctrines, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 88 (2002) (using economic measures of
income elasticity to determine economically efficient point where use of judicial
doctrines equals administrative cost). Efficiency scholars generally reject any
normative force for coherence arguments. See, e.g., Bankman, supra, at 156 ("The
efficiency/welfarist approach regards internal coherency-based scholarship as without
normative force."). Needless to say, those who view coherence and distributive
justice as normatively important find that efficiency scholars have failed to resolve
problems that coherence and distributive justice address, such as interpretation of
potentially ambiguous statutes, consideration of noneconomic motivators of human
conduct, and placement of tax within the broader institutional framework of a
democratic society. See, e.g., William B. Barker, Statutory Interpretation, Comparative
Law, and Economic Theory: Discovering the Grund of Income Taxation, 40 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 821 (2003) (arguing that analogical development of tax statutes in
accord with distributive justice principles is historically appropriate and supportive of
democracy).
18 See infra Part II.A (discussing literalist interpretations and social norm of tax
minimization).
19 Beale, supra note 17, at 371; see also United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,
465 U.S. 805, 815-16 (1984) (noting that fairness of tax system depends on forthright
self-assessment and self-reporting, backed by governmental disclosure requirements);
BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 37 (3d
ed. 1995) ("The heart of the income tax system lies in the obligation of each taxpayer
to declare what he owes.").
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value are critical to the standards governing taxpayers' compliance in
reporting their tax liabilities and to the enforcement mechanisms, such
as specific disclosure requirements and audits, used to assess whether
21taxpayers have appropriately reported and paid their tax liabilities.
Again, interpretations that exploit loopholes to generate artificial tax
benefits fail to satisfy the anti-manipulation value.
Finally, distributive justice focuses on taxpayers' ability to bear
the tax burden, with special regard to the circumstances of those
22whose resources are most thinly stretched. When practitioners
provide aggressive tax planning that results in tax-avoidance
transactions for those able to afford their services, allocative
distortions result that reflect "self-help" rather than political
deliberation. Taxpayers who engage in aggressive tax-avoidance
transactions (whether ultimately determined by the courts to be
shelters, such as the Merrill Lynch transactions, or allowable
customized planning, such as GE's Castle Harbour transaction) enjoy
a reduced tax burden. Those who merely plan transactions that
originate in their businesses and use well-understood mechanisms
bear a heavier tax burden. This type of self-help violates distributive
justice. The effects of such fairness concerns extend beyond the
particular taxpayer. Any perception of general noncompliance may
push taxpayers and practitioners to more aggressive planning to
compensate for the perceived higher level of noncompliance, leading
to a race to the bottom in tax compliance.
20 Beale, supra note 17, at 371-72 (corollary to structural coherence that
underlies aversion to subjective valuations).
21 See infra Parts II.B (discussing tax enforcement and the audit lottery) and II.C
(discussing practice standards).
22 See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, Congress Fiddles While Middle America Burns:
Amending the AMT (and Regular Tax), 6 FLA. TAX REV. 811, 818-25 (2004)
(discussing ability to pay concept of fairness and roots of distributive justice in
institutions of a democratic polity based on personal liberty and equal respect);
Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership,
and Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (elaborating on
ability-to-pay principle); see also William B. Barker, Expanding the Study of
Comparative Tax Law to Promote Democratic Policy: The Example of the Move to
Capital Gains Taxation in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 703
(2005) (analyzing potential for promoting economic equality through taxation in
support of democracy); Sagit Leviner, The Vision of a Good Society and the Tax
System -or- Tax Justice Revisited (June 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=759005 (supporting redistributive taxation based on deontological and
consequentialist arguments concerning benefits of social communities and harms of
concentrated wealth for modern democracies).
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To put an end to abusive tax planning practices will require
constraints on interpretation to support coherence-favoring
approaches and a corresponding change in the customary view of the
tax lawyer's role. The recent development of the reportable
transaction regime with an effective penalty structure and substantial
amendment to Treasury's governance of opinion practice are steps in
23the right direction . These changes constitute the beginning of a
fundamental paradigm shift in the way tax practitioners should relate
to tax administration and to their advisor role.
Accelerating that paradigm shift is the best way to stymie socially
24
wasteful aggressive tax planning. To redirect tax advice away from
pushing the envelope on tax minimization and towards compliance
with tax laws, the statutory standard for positions taken on returns by
taxpayers and advised by tax advisors should be raised.
Corresponding changes should be made in ethical requirements for
tax advice. This Article proposes that a taxpayer should not be able
to take a position on a tax return, nor an advisor advise a position,
unless it is considered to have a greater than fifty percent likelihood of
success on the merits if litigated. To make returns fully transparent in
ways that will permit enforcement of the new standard and the
opinion rules governing practice before the Service, pre-return tax
advice should be subject to the more transparent regime that applies
to tax return preparation, including inapplicability of attorney-client
and work-product privileges for pre-return tax planning advice.
The argument proceeds as follows. Part II considers how current
norms and standards undercut structural coherence and self-
assessment objectives and, ultimately, distributive justice principles.
Part II.A examines the tax minimization social norm based on a
literalist interpretive approach that has permitted tax advisors to skirt
- and sometimes to cross - the boundaries of legality. Part II.B
considers how the lack of enforcement resources, even with some
recent increases, permits abusive return positions to exploit the "audit
lottery." Part II.C discusses the adversarial-based practice standards
that encourage overly aggressive tax filings and the evidentiary
privileges that obscure the information most needed by the Service.
Part III elaborates the two proposals for completing the paradigm
shift. Part IV concludes.
23 See infra Part I.C.1 (discussing codification of reportable transaction regime)
and Part II.C.2 (discussing changes to Circular 230 governing practice before Service).
24 See, e.g., David Weisbach, It's Time to Get Serious About Shelters, 88 TAX




II. CAUSES OF SUPER-AGGRESSIVE TAX PLANNING
Consideration of a tax lawyer's role in aggressive tax planning
cannot begin without first acknowledging the ambiguity of the existing
rules regarding a taxpayer's obligation in respect of reporting
positions taken on tax returns. Taxpayers are required to report their
income and tax liabilities imposed under the Code on returns filed
with the Service.25 Because a taxpayer must self-assess and report the
taxes due on the return, a taxpayer's obligations are determined by
the confidence level that is required for each position reported on the
return. Arguably, the current mosaic of statutory and regulatory
provisions governing taxpayers' reporting obligations establish that
any reporting position that can successfully avoid the various penalties
that may be imposed under the Code and Treasury regulations is a
26proper reporting position. The penalty provisions are enormously
complex and were made more so by recent statutory changes and by
the overlay of Treasury's rules for practice before the Service
(commonly referenced by their original 1921 publication as "Circular
230"). The accuracy-related penalties for substantial understatement,
however, make clear that taxpayers will not be penalized for
understatements in respect of non-shelter items if the position as
reported on the return had "substantial authority" as defined in
27Treasury regulations. If a nonshelter position is adequately disclosed
on the return, a taxpayer will not be penalized if there was a
"reasonable basis" for that position.2 Even if a taxpayer's reporting
position for nonshelter items fails to satisfy these rather low standards,
the accuracy-related penalty for understatements may not be imposed
25 Income taxes are imposed under Code sections 1 (individual and other non-
corporate entities) and 11 (corporate). Return filing requirements are set forth in
sections 6011 (general return requirement) and 6012 (requirement for income tax
returns and related provisions).
26 But see Calvin H. Johnson, "True and Correct:" Standards for Tax Return
Reporting, 43 TAX NOTEs 1521 (June 19, 1989) (arguing that the taxpayer's duty
should be interpreted as a requirement to report the correct amount of tax due).
2 I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i). The regulations interpret the substantial authority
standard as an "objective standard" that is "less stringent than the more likely than
not standard ... but more stringent than the reasonable basis standard." Treas. Regs.
§ 1.6662-4(d)(2). Most commentators consider that positions supported by substantial
authority have a 40 to 45 percent likelihood of success on the merits.
28 I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii). The regulations define "reasonable basis" as
"significantly higher than not frivolous or not patently improper." Treas. Regs.
§ 1.6662-3(b)(3). Most commentators interpret such positions as having a 10 to 20
percent likelihood of success on the merits.
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if the taxpayer successfully establishes an affirmative defense that the
taxpayer acted with "reasonable cause" and a "good faith belief" that
29the position was appropriate.
Given the ambiguity of degree of certainty required for reporting
tax positions, literalism has served as a strong mechanism for
supporting innovative tax minimization structures.0  The tax
interpretive problem is aggravated because of its interrelation with a
social norm and standards of tax practice, including a client-centered
ethical structure, that favor client advocacy and tax minimization over
duty to the tax system. Tax attorneys' interpretations take place in
the context of (i) a social norm that celebrates lawyers' innovative tax
minimization planning in customized transactional settings without
regard to limitations deriving from purposive interpretations, (ii)
statutory standards that require little regard for the public role of tax
lawyers, (iii) ethical rules that cast the government as an adversary of
the attorneys' client, and (iv) minimal enforcement that creates a
tempting audit lottery for taxpayers. The protection of evidentiary
privileges is the icing on the cake for the tax minimization party. The
following sections explore these interrelationships more fully.
A. Tax Minimization Norms
Aggressive tax planning focused on designing stand-alone loss-
generating or income-deflecting/deferring transactions that can be
cloned and sold to high bidders is widely viewed as crossing a line
separating legitimate tax practice from abuse. Peter Canellos, a
prominent New York attorney, suggests, in fact, that there are two tax
bars - the legitimate bar and the shelter bar - for whom the
methods used, the attitudes towards the law, and the end results are
• • •31
diametrically opposed or at least easily distinguishable. Bradley
29 I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (no penalty imposed for any portion of an understatement
satisfying the reasonable cause/good faith standard, which may include reliance on an
opinion of a tax adviser).
30 Dana L. Trier, Beyond the Smell Test: The Role of Substantive Anti-Avoidance
Rules in Addressing the Corporate Tax Shelter Problem, TAXES, Mar. 2000, at 62, 64
("At the heart of these transactions is often a technical basis for the tax advantage
sought.").
31 Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on Substance, Form and
Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L.
REV. 47, 55-57 (2001); see also Emily A. Parker, Acting Chief Counsel, Internal
Revenue Service, Speech to the TEI/LMSB Financial Services Industry Conference
(Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/tei-92203.pdf (suggesting
two "creeds," one that applies common sense and another that yields to market
2006]
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Wendel similarly argues that elite tax practitioners who are not a part
of the shelter bar develop customary interpretations that provide the
base line for evaluating correctness of statutory interpretations: he
assumes that their work is guided by an attitude of professionalism
that recognizes the need for a "stable, determinate framework of legal
rights" and therefore constrains the kind of bootstrapping that plans
32
around formal legal norms.
Excluding those who participate in outright criminal tax fraud,33 I
suspect that there is not such a clear line between good and bad tax
bars. There is instead a spectrum of behavior from prudent to
abusive, with many tax advisors sometimes at the riskier end and
some almost always there, depending on market pressures.34 Many of
the techniques evidenced in abusive shelters are part of everyday
practice in the development of customized tax transactions. The
pressures to interpret rules without regard to common sense); Bankman, supra note
17, at 150-51, 153-54 (noting significant difference in approach between junior
attorneys who are politically conservative, textualist and rule-bound and senior
attorneys who support judicial doctrines and standards-based interpretations; and
suggesting that the former are more similar in approach to accountants who have
been both "the primary purveyors of shelters" and more supportive of literalism); W.
Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1167, 1213-17
(2005) (discussing relevance of particular community of tax practitioners to
determination of appropriate norms for professional conduct, based primarily on
Canellos' description).
32 See Wendel, supra note 31, at 1216 (arguing for concept of community of tax
lawyers acting as custodians of the law by developing a collective understanding of
statutory meaning through consultation and over time); see also Mark P. Gergen, The
Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. REV. 131, 132 (2001) (suggesting that
tax law will sometimes turn "on the common knowledge of tax professionals").
33 Ethical rules prohibit lawyers from assisting clients to commit criminal or
fraudulent conduct or advising clients to engage in such conduct. MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002). "Hence, a lawyer should not participate in a sham
transaction; for example, a transaction to effectuate criminal or fraudulent escape of
tax liability." WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 195.
'4 Cf. Parker, supra note 31, at 3 (discussing market pressures causing "deal
creep" towards ever more aggressive interpretations).
" Other analysts have recognized this parallelism between tax shelters and
customized tax planning:
[Tax shelter transactions] produced results that were unwarranted,
unintended, or inconsistent with the overall structure or underlying policy
of the Internal Revenue Code. These transactions had no economic
substance or business purpose other than to reduce taxes. Abusive tax
shelters can be custom-designed for a single user or prepared as a generic
tax product sold to multiple clients.
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underlying tax minimization social norm is dominant throughout tax
practitioner ranks - from promoters of abusive cloned shelters to tax
lawyers at preeminent law firms who customize deal structures for
multinational clients, from auditors for Fortune 500 companies to
small-firm CPAs who almost absent-mindedly invent business
purposes for their clients. In both customized planning and abusive
shelters, advisors tweak and twist minute details of facts or law to
steer a transaction structure through the Code with the least possible
tax burden.37 They utilize Code provisions in new ways or in
conjunction with a factual context not contemplated at the time the
provision was drafted, often yielding results that fall outside the
38provision's purpose. Tax lawyers even discuss among themselves
how far it is acceptable to push rules. It is not clear that this practice
reinforces professional norms so much as it provides comfort in
numbers to lawyers - sometimes representing all firms that advise
.... 39
particular types of deals - who apply a similar interpretation.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 1, 5-6 (noting that report focuses on marketed tax
shelters).
36 A full discussion of the burgeoning field of norm research is beyond the scope
of this article. For a sampling of the literature, see Robert B. Ahdieh, The Role of
Groups in Norm Transformation: A Dramatic Sketch, in Three Parts, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L.
231 (2005) (exploring role of groups in norm transformation); Ann E. Carlson,
Classifying Social Norms, in THE JURISDYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
CHANGE AND THE PRAGMATIC VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Jim Chen ed., 2003),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=466002 (emphasizing group size and bonding in
ability of norms to resolve social problems); Amir N. Licht, Social Norms and the
Law: A Social Institutional Approach (2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=710621 (using social institutional approach that views norms as
interdependent systems); Richard H. McAdams & Eric B. Rasmusen, Norms in Law
and Economics (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=580843 (surveying
literature on paradigms for analyzing norms, defined as "behavioral regularities
supported at least in part by normative attitudes").
37 See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, Tax Minimization and Corporate Responsibility, 96
TAX NOTES 1523 (Sept. 9, 2002) (noting lack of line between planning and tax
evasion, and "inventiveness" of lawyers who comply with letter of the law while
undermining its purpose).
38 See, e.g., Parker, supra note 31, at 3 (noting that some advisors "view the Code
and regulations as technical rule books to be read literally and without regard to
common sense").
39 This is, of course, what Mark Gergen called the "common knowledge of tax
professionals" based on "what tax lawyers commonly do and have done." Gergen,
supra note 32, at 132, 146. The difficulty with the lack of transparency in the
development of such lore is that one firm's decision to push the envelope can lead to a
race to the bottom, as every firm decides that it will go along with the interpretation
rather than lose clients in that area of practice. Clients threaten to take their business
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Perhaps the best evidence is the role of acclaimed tax experts in
notorious shelter transactions. R.J. Ruble was a famed rainmaker for
an upstanding law firm, Brown & Wood, before he became notorious
as the creator of expensive cloned shelter opinions for basis shift
transactions.4 Mark Kuller, a partnership expert formerly with King
& Spalding and now with McKee Nelson, had a role in the Merrill
Lynch shelters and then later advised the sophisticated founding
partners of the Long Term Capital hedge fund (whose near collapse
almost brought down global capital markets) on their abusive lease-. 42
stripping and partnership loss-generating transactions.
I agree with Wende143 that tax lawyers ought to reject some
applications that seem permitted under a literal interpretation, on the
grounds that a structurally coherent view of the tax system (or a
particular subsystem, such as partnership tax rules) requires an
interpretation in line with underlying purposes. I question, however,
whether professionalism is sufficient to cause tax lawyers actually to
resist the business pressures to use coherence-destroying
interpretations to accomplish clients' goals. The fact that professional
tax bars, such as the New York State Bar Association Tax Section, in
to a more compliant attorney, and they may make good on those threats.
40 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 7 (finding that Sidley Austin Brown &
Wood facilitated sale of potentially abusive tax shelters with "boilerplate tax opinion
letters"); Linda M. Beale, Developments May Lead SEC to Ban Certain Tax Services
Under Sarbanes-Oxley Independence Rules, 16 J. TAX'N FIN. INSTS. 5, 11 & nn.55-56
(2003) (describing FLIP/OPIS basis shifting transactions listed in Notice 2001-45);
Paul Braverman, Still in the Shadows, AM. LAW., Oct. 1, 2003, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1063212108768 (discussing suits against R.J.
Ruble and Sidley Austin Brown & Wood and Jenkens & Gilchrist and relationship
between Ruble and KPMG in connection with FLIP and OPIS shelters). Others have
noted this propensity for "bad" lawyers to be recognized only after they have been
exposed. "Interestingly, tax shelter promoters like R.J. Ruble of [Brown & Wood]
and Paul Daugerdas of Jenkens & Gilchrist, who helped hatch several large-scale
suspect tax shelters, are denounced as 'rogue' partners by their colleagues after they
are publicly exposed, but were hailed as 'rainmakers' before they got caught."
Sheldon D. Pollack & Jay A. Soled, Tax Professionals Behaving Badly, 105 TAX
NOTEs 201, 205 n.26 (Oct. 11, 2004).
41 See Lee A. Sheppard, Shelter Opinions: The Tax Equivalent of Pasties, 87 TAX
NoTEs 17, 17 (Apr. 3, 2000) (discussing ACM Partnership and noting that attorneys
were "amply degreed lawyers that many Americans would consider among the
country's best and brightest").
42 See Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 147-53
(D. Conn. 2004), affd, 150 F. App'x 40 (2d Cir. 2005); Joe Walsh, Opinion Letters
Offer Scant Shelter from Tax Shelter Penalties, 74 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 196 (2005).
43 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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their role as professional participants in the public debate sometimes
provide thoughtful commentary on proposed tax provisions does not
prove otherwise.4 Individual lawyers may argue for public-regarding
positions on many issues yet engage in loophole exploitation on
particular issues in which their own lucrative practice resides. A bar
may provide insightful commentary while nudging tax administrators
towards accepting a more aggressive, client-favorable perspective on
particular issues. The public function of providing commentary may
even spur inventiveness that permits self-help rewriting of the tax laws
when there is persistent client and market pressure for a particular
type of tax product.
The current social norm among tax practitioners - whether the
so-called legitimate or shelter bar - views it as reasonable for
taxpayers to graft large, complex and costly structures or layers of
transactions onto ordinary business transactions in order to lower tax
liabilities.4 ' The broadly shared social norm accepts that advisors push
rules to the limits of the interpretive burden they are perceived as
being able to bear by applying literal interpretations that may
disregard the broader context of application.46 "Tax practitioners are
well-versed in finding (or manufacturing) loopholes. 4 7 And these are
not merely "shady, fly-by-night" practitioners - they are "talented
professionals at the top of their fields., 48 The wide acceptance of the
practice results in a view that the statutory rules' "rigidity does not
allow a court to reverse an unreasonable result that the statute
See, e.g., Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the
Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 81 (2006) (discussing organized tax bar's
law reform efforts as "attempts to reinforce the professional authority of elite tax
lawyers, which had been eroded by the tax shelter market").
45 See, e.g., Paul J. Sax, ABA Tax Section Chair Writes Finance on Antishelter
Recommendations, TAX NOTEs TODAY (Mar. 24, 2000) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT
file, elec. cit., 2000 TNT 58-14) (letter from Paul J. Sax, Chair, Section of Tax'n, Am.
Bar Ass'n, to Sen. Daniel Moynihan (Mar. 21, 2000)) ("The ethical duty of [law or
accounting firms and company taxpayers] is to comply with the law, and if there are
gaps in the Code, they are entitled to take advantage of them to their benefit.").
46 See B. John Williams, Jr., Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, Address
to the Chicago Bar Ass'n Fed. Tax'n Comm. (Feb. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/shelters-feb25.pdf (addressing "technical tax shelters"
supported by technical statutory readings but not by substance of transactions).
47 Richard M. Lipton & Steven R. Dixon, "Tax Shelter" and "Tax Shelter
Opinion" - IRS, in Another Try at Circular 230, Strikes Out Again, 100 J. TAX'N 134,
141 (2004) (emphasis added).




Learned Hand, more than any other person, exemplifies this view
of the taxpayer's inherent right to manipulate the Code. His fame
rests on a 1934 case that ironically gave birth to the economic
substance doctrine - a judicial doctrine that has been used to
overturn noneconomic results reached by literalist applications of tax
statutes.
Anyone may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as
low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which
will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to
increase one's taxes.50
In practice, few tax lawyers question this norm; in fact, I would argue
that most consider the Hand statement an apt expression of the tax
practitioners' creed.5 Recent empirical research on the perception of
tax evasion (a term of art referring to criminal tax fraud) found that
most subjects viewed tax evasion as more or less equivalent to
49 James W. Colliton, Standards, Rules and the Decline of the Courts in the Law
of Taxation, 99 DICK. L. REV. 265, 313-14 (1995); see also Parker, supra note 31
(discussing "Wall Street Rule" that treats technical shelters based on literal
interpretations and involving large sums of money as invulnerable to enforcement);
cf. Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629, 633
(2005) (arguing that there is no such thing as "plain meaning").
50 Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), affd, 293 U.S. 465, 469
(1935) ("The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise
would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot
be doubted."). In a later dissent, Hand made an even stronger statement:
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so
arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does
so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay
more than the law demands: taxes are enforced extractions, not voluntary
contributions.
Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir.) (Hand, J., dissenting).
Hand himself apparently later questioned the tax avoidance standard he had so
vigorously expressed. George K. Yin, JCT Chief Discusses the Tax Gap, 107 TAX
NOTES 1449, 1452 (June 13, 2005).
51 As an inexperienced associate, I encountered quizzical looks on those
occasions when I queried peers at various prestigious New York firms about the
proper limits of tax minimization. Respected associates tended to quote Hand as
proof that loophole-exploitation is a taxpayer right. See also David J. Miller, Pay-triot
Games, AMERICA'S VOICES, Oct. 5, 2002, http://www.americasvoices.org/avarc2002/
archives2002/MillerDJ/MillerDJ_100502.htm (using Hand quotation to introduce blog
that discusses loophole exploitation).
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minimum wage law violations and as less serious than other white
collar crimes. 2 Interestingly, tax professors and graduate tax students
both considered tax evasion less serious an offense than did MBA
students. 3 Given this tendency to treat tax crimes as less serious than
other offenses, even government officials may find it difficult to cast
aspersions on the tax minimization approach.
A "pursue it as far as it can take you" norm inevitably loses sight
of the importance of the integrity of the legal system in determining
appropriate conduct within the system. There is something
substantially wrong with an approach to the ethical position of lawyers
that suggests that hunting for tax gold, as Mark Gergen puts it, may be
an appropriate professional activity. 4 That approach lets lawyers
accept questionable interpretations, such as the REMIC structure
with a put option guaranteeing a type of shortfall that was not allowed
under prior interpretations of the REMIC rules.5
If an attorney must conjecture a business purpose for a
transaction that a client enters for tax benefits, the transaction does
56not have a tax-neutral business purpose . The practitioner's role
should be merely to record the client's pre-existing business purpose,
not to invent nontax purposes. A purpose resulting from post hoc
rationalization is inherently suspect as not founded in the client's
business needs but rather in its tax desiderata. In practice, the
conjecture may take place in a context in which client and practitioner
discuss the transaction and the practitioner effectively suggests a
purpose that the client then represents to the practitioner. Such
interchanges may appear almost ordinary to many practitioners. The
practitioner may rationalize that the client cannot be expected to
know which reason, of its different and sometimes conflicting reasons
for considering a transaction, would be considered a worthy rationale
for tax purposes. Even if the highlighted concern would never have
been considered important or expressed by the taxpayer without the
practitioner's prompting, the practitioner might argue that it was
inchoate in the transaction all along - a useful outcome of an
52 Stewart Karlinksy et al., Perceptions of Tax Evasion as a Crime, 2 eJ. TAX
RES. 226, 230 (2004), http://www.atax.unsw.edu.au/ejtr.
53 Id.
"[Y]ou can pick up tax gold if you find it in the street while going about your
business, but you cannot go hunting for it." Gergen, supra note 32, at 140.
55 See supra note 15 (discussing REMIC GMC securities).
56 Others have noted that generating a business purpose for a client is as
unethical as creating "any other misleading evidence." Frederic G. Corneel, Ethical
Guidelines for Tax Practice, 28 TAX L. REV. 1, 26 (1972).
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arrangement clearly undertaken for its tax benefits, but now saved
because of a serendipitous discovery.57 This illustrates the difficulty in
drawing the proper line for the conduct.58
Similarly, if an attorney must modify a transaction to produce
some prospect of an economic profit independent of expected tax
benefits, the transaction lacks economic substance. Wrapping a tax-
avoidance transaction into a more complex arrangement with other
sources of potential profits, which could have been produced without
the shelter transaction costs, does not convert avoidance into mere tax
planning for business transactions. Rationalizing a structure to fit it
within rules that give the intended tax results may stretch the rules
well beyond the purpose for which they were intended.
Correlation of the tax minimization norm and literalism has had a
negative impact on the Code and court decisions. Discovery of new
loopholes leads to more complex tax regimes in particular areas,
heightened use of localized interpretations to invent around the new
rules, and further degradation of the professional perspective on tax
advice. 9 In the 1970s and 1980s, tax shelters marketed to wealthy
individuals primarily used partnership structures that combined
interest deductions on nonrecourse debt with depreciation deductions
to generate artificially high losses for partners with only nominal
economic investments.60 The response to those twentieth-century
individual shelters was the development of two regimes of anti-abuse
statutory rules that limited availability of losses by requiring a
taxpayer to track categories of income (the passive activity loss rules)
and limit losses to economic investment (the at-risk rules).6' Much of
the planning that followed involved new ways to create artificial losses
57 An example is Enron's development of contingent liability shelters. 1 STAFF
OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON
CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND
COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 119 (Joint Comm. Print
2003) (describing Project Tanya, designed to offset a 1995 capital gain by transferring
contingent environmental liabilities but implemented with benefit liabilities when
Enron discovered it did not have requisite environmental liabilities).
58 The main text on tax ethics considers drawing the line between acceptable
planning and unacceptable tax planning "[o]ne of the more perplexing problems."
WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 203.
59 See, e.g., Robert J. Peroni, A Policy Critique of the Section 469 Passive Loss
Rules, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1988) (suggesting that particularized statutory anti-
abuse rules exact heavy cost in "inefficiency, inequity, and complexity").
60 See Beale, SEC Heat, supra note 6, at 229 n.43.
61 I.R.C. §§ 465 (at-risk rules), 469 (passive activity loss rules).
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outside those rules. Structures like Castle Harbour, where income is
deferred by using a foreign accommodation bank as a purported
partner, were the result. Because the taxpayer was able to make a
literal argument for compliance with partnership allocation rules (and
the government slighted arguments it should have made), the court
blessed the structure's use of partnership rules to turn a financing into
a tax deferral. Customized tax planning, in the context of the last
decade's surge of promoted and cloned shelters, therefore degrades
the effectiveness of detailed modifications of statutory provisions as a
means to stop abuse.
Because of the correlation between tax minimization and
literalism, it is difficult to find a suitable rule-based response. For
example, Congress might agree that a purported partnership
transaction like Castle Harbour should not have the benefit of the
partnership rules when application of those rules eliminates, or at
least defers, taxation on a considerable portion of the purported U.S.
partner's income because (i) the economic substance of the
transaction appears to be a debtor-creditor relationship taxable under
the normal rules for debt instruments and (ii) the lender is a tax-
exempt entity (a charitable organization or a foreign bank that is not
subject to U.S. taxation on its income from the transaction).63 If the
courts habitually fail to apply the substance-over-form judicial
doctrine to recharacterize such arrangements, Congress might well
decide that it should take action to prevent foreign banks from acting
as accommodation parties by merely translating their lending
requirements into purported partnership documents (and side
agreements, such as Castle Harbour's investment account
requirement). Similarly, Congress might consider ways to prevent
importation of losses into partnership settings, as in Long Term
Capital Holdings.
Various anti-abuse changes to the partnership rules could be
considered, and a number of provisions dealing with basis and basis
adjustments were in fact finally enacted in the American Jobs
62 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
63 For example, if the yield on a loan is contingent because of losses allocable to
a lender only in remote circumstances, the arrangement may be a contingent payment
debt instrument, the taxation of which is established under the original issue discount
regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4 (tax treatment of contingent payment debt
instruments). If the contingency is sufficiently remote or incidental, the regular
original issue discount rules would govern. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1275-4(a)(5), 1.1275-2(h).
If the rate is merely variable, the arrangement may be subject to the variable rate
debt instrument regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-5.
20061
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Creation Act of 2004 (2004 Jobs Act).64 The change to the section
704(c) allocation rule reinforces the existing partnership anti-abuse
regulations to make clear that the partnership rules cannot be abused
to shift a loss to a noncontributing partner as purportedly done in
Long Term Capital Holdings.65 Congress could also consider further
changes:
" disallow income allocations to nontaxable foreign partners
that are not in proportion to their capital contributions for
partnerships with finite terms of 10 years or less on formation;
" further limit flexibility of the partnership allocation rules by
requiring remedial (or even, curative) allocations under
section 704(c) and partnership basis adjustments upon any
distribution or sale of an interest; or
" enact a partnership anti-abuse rule that disallows partnership
characterization whenever a purported partnership functions
economically as a financing in which a tax-indifferent party is
allocated income inclusions the present value of which
exceeds the present value of its anticipated economic returns
under the transaction structure.66
Each of these provisions could potentially close a number of
"loopholes" or gaps in the partnership Code provisions created by
literalist interpretations that fail to acknowledge the demand from
64 See, e.g., American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 833(a),
118 Stat. 1418, 1589 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 Jobs Act]; I.R.C. §§ 704 (adding section
704(c)(1)(C) to disallow allocation of built-in loss to successor partner), 734
(amending section 734(a) and (b) and adding section 734(d) to require partnership
basis adjustment with respect to property distribution where distributee partner's
outside basis exceeds partnership's inside basis), 743 (amending sections 743(a) and
(b) and adding section 743(d) to require partnership basis adjustments following
transfer of partnership interest when partnership has substantial built-in loss), 833(b),
833(c).
65 See I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(C) (added by the 2004 Jobs Act § 833(a)). The
partnership anti-abuse regulation generally requires that partnership rules be used
consistently with the intent of the partnership regime and not to shift income or losses
to reduce tax liability. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(a).
66 See, e.g., AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2004: LAW, EXPLANATION AND
ANALYSIS (CCH) 375 (2004) (commenting that S. 1637, the Senate version, would
have repealed section 754 to make basis adjustments mandatory but conference
committee relented because of real estate and other lobbying); STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND
REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 26 (Joint Comm. Print 2005) (suggesting that both
Castle Harbour and ACM Partnership structures satisfy present value criterion).
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structural coherence that provisions be construed, to the extent
possible, as part of a coherent whole. Even with these changes,
however, savvy practitioners applying literalist interpretations would
seek (and inevitably find) new avoidance mechanisms, including
loopholes created by the new rules themselves.
Cycles of after-the-fact statutory enactments to end abuses
therefore present problems that suggest it may be more worthwhile to
develop solutions that directly affect practitioner norms. While some
of the proposed or enacted partnership rules may be meritorious,
statutory responses to each new abuse generally require extensive
resources through a lengthy drafting and promulgation period, limit
the usefulness of the partnership form for the entrepreneurial joint
ventures that the rules were intended to benefit, and add complexity
that may foster other rule-arbitrage abuses. Similar problems arise
with elaboration of more detailed anti-abuse corporate rules (e.g., the
2004 Jobs Act prohibition against importation of aggregate losses).67
If the change is too limited, avoidance behavior simply shifts to the
remaining gap. Such changes may actually reward - with new clients
and enhanced "tax whiz" reputations - the most aggressive advisors
who respond rapidly with nominal revisions to existing planning
techniques or who devise creative methods of avoiding tax using the
new rules. Former Treasury Deputy Secretary Stuart Eizenstat
described the use of statutory revision to eliminate old shelters only to
have a crop of new ones arise in their place as similar to "the mythical
Hydra, except recast in the context of modern corporate finance., 68
Nor is it clear that codification of broadly worded anti-abuse rules
can effectively counter these abuses, both because of the sheer
difficulty in passing such legislation in the face of intense lobbying and
because of the likelihood that codification would result in an under-
inclusive test. For example, Congress has considered codification of
the economic substance doctrine for a decade, including in the Senate
versions of the 2004 Jobs Act 6 and the 2005 highway bill.70 Failure of
67 See 2004 Jobs Act § 836 (adding section 362(e) limitation on transfers of built-
in-losses); I.R.C. § 362(e); see also infra note 72.
68 Stuart E. Eizenstat, Deputy Sec'y of Treas., Remarks to the Tax Executives
Inst. Midyear Conference (Mar. 20, 2000), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases/ls476.htm.
69 H.R. REP. No. 108-755, at 585-86 (2004) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1341, 1651-52 (explaining Senate economic substance requirement
without discussing conference deletion of provision); see Beale, SEC Heat, supra note
6, at 250-51 (discussing earlier congressional proposals to codify doctrine); Abusive
Tax Shelter Shutdown Act of 1999, H.R. 2255, 106th Cong. § 3 (1999) (early Doggett
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passage may rest in part with lobbyists and those in Congress who
support literalist interpretations and do not want to endorse the
various substance-over-form judicial doctrines." Others, however,
have argued against codification because of the fear that a statutory
anti-abuse rule would be prone to the same problem that plagues most
Code provisions - it would be interpreted literally, without regard to
its purpose, by practitioners and conservative courts. As a result, its
scope would be too narrow so that it would not apply in situations for
which some version of the economic substance judicial doctrine might
have otherwise been considered appropriately applied, and it would
not limit abuse. 72 The better solution may be to encourage continued
court development of the doctrine with supportive congressional
statements at each opportunity. Courts have broader scope, in
particular cases, to extend the common law as needed - uncertainty
about application weighs more heavily in the cost-benefit analysis
than would a narrowed, codified doctrine that was seldom applied and
71thus may more effectively influence taxpayer norms.
bill codifying economic substance).
70 Safe, Accountable, Flexible Transportation Equity Act of 2005, H.R. 3, 109th
Cong. §§ 5521-5523 (engrossed amendment as agreed to by the Senate) (codifying
economic substance and providing for additional penalties); H.R. REP. No. 109-12
(2005) (reporting highway bill out of conference without economic codification).
71 See, e.g., Debates Continue as Hearing on 'Corporate Tax Shelter Problem'
Concludes, TAX ANALYST'S DAILY HIGHLIGHTS & DOCUMENTS, Mar. 10, 2000, at
3664, 3666 (noting Congressman Roth's concern that codification proposals changed
relevant standards); Ryan J. Donmoyer, Archer Tells Administration No on Shelters
and Be Careful with FSCs, 86 TAX NOTES 1815 (Mar. 27, 2000) (reporting
Congressman Archer's objections to shelter proposals and Congressman Doggett's
view that Congress's failure to act on codification reflected lack of desire to curb
shelters); John D. McKinnon & John Harwood, Tax Shelters Come Under Fire, WALL
ST. J., June 6, 2003, at A4 (noting that shelter measures were dropped because of
heavy lobbying and complaints from conservatives that it amounted to a tax increase).
72 See Steven A. Bank, Codifying Judicial Doctrines: No Cure for Rules But
More Rules?, 54 SMU L. REV. 37, 41 (2001) (suggesting that codification will lead
practitioners to expect strict adherence circumventing purpose); Lawrence Zelenak,
Codifying Anti-Avoidance Doctrines and Controlling Corporate Tax Shelters, 54 SMU
L. REV. 177, 185-86 (2001) (arguing that codification may initially lead to more
judicial enforcement, but ultimately will provide another tool for tax avoidance
planning).
73 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 38-41
(1997) (discussing benefits of norms that support less risk-taking). The growing
recalcitrance of courts to apply the judicial doctrines may moot this point. In two
recent cases using the contingent liability shelter, Black & Decker Corp. v. United
States, 340 F. Supp. 2d 621 (D. Md. 2004), and Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62
Fed. Cl. 716 (Fed. Cl. 2004), trial judges refused to apply the economic substance
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The focus on norms suggests that there is much at stake. If we
can influence norm development, we may be able to shift the tax
practice norm from literalist distortion of statutory purpose towards
more public-regarding behavior. Two factors may be especially
noteworthy here - enhanced enforcement (aided by elimination of
some privilege claims) and heightened standards. Although
enforcement might theoretically discourage positive compliance tax
norms, in practice it appears to support their development and
maintenance.75 Accordingly, the audit lottery resulting from under-
enforcement simultaneously reinforces the tax minimization norm and
discourages compliance. Similarly, low statutory and ethical standards
for tax reporting may suggest lack of concern about tax cheating and
encourage the tax minimization norm, suggesting that adoption of
appropriate tax standards and privileges may nurture greater
compliance. Part B considers current Service enforcement efforts,
and Part C explores the relevant statutory and ethical standards.
B. Enforcement and the Audit Lottery
The current enforcement push began with the attention on
corporate tax shelters in the 1990s. Treasury and Congress saw
noncompliance as lowering corporate tax revenues and increasing the
76gap between financial statement and taxable income profit reports.
doctrine on the basis that it is an improper use of judicial discretion in an area of
statutory law such as tax, where Congress may correct any perceived flaw through
legislation.
74 Allen Kenney, Circular 230 Clarifications On the Way, Namorato Says, 107
TAX NoTEs 542, 543 (May 2, 2005) (reporting necessity for prestigious firms to "instill
a culture that encourages their lawyers to 'drive in the center of the road"').
75 Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax
Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453 (2003) [hereinafter Lederman, Interplay]. A
reciprocity principle (similar to the Golden Rule) that helps avoid conflict by
encouraging "irrational" sharing behavior may support positive compliance norms
(and, indirectly, rule of law and related liberty and equality principles). See, e.g., Dan
M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner's Law and Social
Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 377 (2002) (suggesting reciprocation explains
cooperation); Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333
(2001) (similar); Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U.
KAN. L. REV. 971, 972-74, 977 (2003) (discussing literature regarding factors beyond
enforcement that may encourage compliance); Theodore P. Seto, A General Theory
of Normativity (Loyola Law Sch. (Los Angeles) Public Law and Legal Theory,
Research Paper No. 2003-26, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=458261
(using game theory).
76 See Beale, SEC Heat, supra note 6, at 220-21.
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Survey data also suggested cheating had become generally more
acceptable between 1999 and 2001,7" although the 2004 survey data
suggest a fairly stable attitude towards tax cheating over the last five
78years. The 1998 Service restructuring likely exacerbated compliance
problems by reallocating resources from enforcement to service,
switching the burden of proof to the Service in some contexts, and
imposing restrictions on Service personnel that dampened
enforcement enthusiasm.7 9 The most recent estimate of the overall tax
gap, based on 2001 information, puts the excess of taxes due over
taxes reported and paid between $310-$353 billion.80
Taxpayers (and tax advisors) willing to take aggressive tax
positions likely engage in Kaldor-Hicks cost-benefit analysissl in
deciding what level of avoidance to adopt in their returns.8' The
economic model suggests that efficient breach of tax rules (except for
outright fraud that might incur criminal sanctions) is acceptable:
77 See, e.g., Camilla E. Watson, Legislating Morality: The Duty to the Tax System
Reconsidered, 51 KAN. L. REV. 1197, 1219 (2003) (indicating an increase from 13% to
24%); As Audits Decline, Fewer Taxpayers Balk at a Bit of Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
19, 2002, at All (describing drop from 87% in 1999 to 76% in 2001 in those who
considered cheating "not at all" acceptable, with 3% margin of error).
78 IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, 2004 TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY 5 (2005),
http://www.treas.gov/irsob/documents/release040405.pdf (86% of respondents said
cheating was "not at all" acceptable in 2004).
79 See Watson, supra note 77, at 1224; IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, ANNUAL
REPORT 2004, at 9, 12-13 (2004), http://www.treas.gov/irsob/documents/2004-
annual-report.pdf (showing decline in audits of business taxpayers and other
problems).
80 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-38 (Mar. 29, 2005) (New IRS Study Provides
Preliminary Tax Gap Estimate) (releasing Fact Sheet 2005-14, showing recalculated
tax gap larger than previously determined); Tax Compliance: Reducing the Tax Gap
Can Contribute to Fiscal Sustainability but Will Require a Variety of Strategies:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance (2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d05527t.pdf (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller Gen. of the United States)
[hereinafter Tax Compliance] (same).
81 See, e.g., Jules Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A
Critical Review of Richard Posner's The Economics of Justice, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105,
1106-07 (1982) (book review) (summarizing Kaldor-Hicks analysis); John Hicks, The
Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939) (seminal article); Nicholas
Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,
49 ECON. J. 549 (1939) (same).
"' See, e.g., Bernard Fortin et al., Tax Evasion and Social Interactions (IZA
Discussion Papers, Paper No. 1359, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=609921
(explaining that tax evasion model assumes taxpayers are "individualistic and amoral"
"isolated expected utility maximizers" but finding that social interaction bears on
attitudes towards compliance).
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"taxpayers are neither honest nor dishonest, but merely rational
calculators of what is in their best interest. 8 3 The externality of lower
tax revenues is "distributed diffusely among the public at large."
84
Tax departments operate as profit centers, corporate managers focus
almost exclusively on the bottom line, and all is helped along by the
exploding use of financial derivatives that permit firms to embed
avoidance techniques in purported business transactions. 8 The result
is substantial corporate underreporting (estimated at 17.4%) and
noncompliance with the early form of shelter registration rules:
playing the audit lottery permits corporate managers or shareholders
to garner windfalls at the cost of other taxpayers or government
program beneficiaries.
This economic compliance model is at odds with compliance
expectations that should result from an understanding of the role of
structural coherence in maintaining the tax system's integrity. It
discards other-regarding attitudes as either irrelevant externalities to
rational choices or, in the bounded rationality approach, as factors
that can be described (though not well predicted) through modeling of
heuristics and biases.
Even though this economic analysis does not adequately describe
all taxpayer behavior, it suggests that structural coherence and
compliance require external reinforcement to raise the visibility and
costs of nonconforming behavior sufficiently to impact risk
87
assessment . Government studies continue to point out the need for
83 Slemrod, supra note 1, at 882.
84 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured
Finance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 22 n.109 (2005).
85 See Beale, SEC Heat, supra note 6, at 229, 242-43 (referencing studies on
increasing derivatives use and pressure on tax professionals to add to corporate
profitability); Slemrod, supra note 1, at 893 (suggesting that windfall gains from
avoidance primarily benefit shareholders and tax managers).
86 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 60 (excerpting KPMG materials
discussing low cost of registration noncompliance and not providing the Service a
"road map" to aggressive transactions); Slemrod, supra note 1, at 879, 893-94; Mihir
A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value 21
(2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=689562 (concluding that "tax avoidance
and managerial efforts to divert value from shareholders are intertwined").
87 See, e.g., Michael A. Perino, How Vigorously Will the SEC Enforce Attorney
Up-the-Ladder Reporting Rules? An Analysis of Institutional Constraints, Norms, and
Biases (St. John's Legal Studies Research Paper, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=480502 (noting empirical evidence that increased disclosure
deters more than increased sanctions).
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increased enforcement as a concomitant to increased sanctions. 8" Yet
the rise of literalism and the economic interpretation of legal
obligations have come at a time when enforcement resources have
been severely cut or diverted to taxpayer support.89 Even with recent
increases in enforcement budgets,9° the Service has fewer auditors
than necessary and subjects significantly fewer returns to full audits
than it did in the late 1980s. 9' Auditors are disadvantaged because of
their lack of time to study returns or particular transactions, and they
See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 7-9 (recommending increased
Service enforcement of compliance rules).
89 See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. to Close Walk-In Centers as Agency Faces
Tighter Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2005, at A20 (noting 1998 cuts in enforcement to
fund services, current plans to cut $57 million, and problems caused by lack of funding
for auditors and tax collectors). Since 1988, the number of returns filed has increased
26% and the number of permanent Service staff has fallen 31%. Transactional
Records Access Clearinghouse, IRS Staff Has Declined While Returns Have
Increased, http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/highlights/current/irsStaffG.html; see also
Mortimer M. Caplin, The Tax Lawyer's Role in the Way the American Tax System
Works, 24 VA. TAX REV. 969 (2005) (noting harmful effect of shift to customer
service).
90 See, e.g., Allen Kenney, Djd Vu? Bush Wants $500 Million for IRS to
Toughen Up in 2006, 106 TAX NOTES 747 (Feb. 14, 2005) (noting funding is still $1
billion short of oversight board's recommendation); Robert Guy Matthews, IRS's
Tougher Stance Faces Resistance - Agency Suspends Plan to Close Help Centers as
Critics Call for Bigger Emphasis on Services, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2005, at A4 (noting
Service 2006 budget request for a $500 million enforcement increase in context of
significant declines in auditors and audits compared to a decade ago).
91 See, e.g., Tax Compliance, supra note 80, at 13-14 (noting concurrent decline
in enforcement resources and increased workload resulted in decline in complex field
audits and coverage that is "considerably lower than it was just a few years ago");
Slemrod, supra note 1, at 881 (noting that small corporation audits fell from 7.92% to
1.55% between 1997 and 2003 and Coordinated Industry Case Program large
corporate audits were significantly reduced in quality). In 1978, audit coverage
exceeded 2% of all returns. 1980 I.R.S. ANN. REP. 68-69. In 1999, the overall audit
rate dropped to a low of 0.5%. IRS Statistics of Income Tax Stats, Enforcing Laws,
Examination Coverage: Recommended and Average Recommended Additional Tax
After Examination, by Type and Size of Return, Fiscal Year 2000, http://www.irs.gov/
taxstats/compliancestats/index.html. Audit rates have increased slightly since that
time, but with increasing use of correspondence audits and fewer face-to-face audits.
Id. See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Audits of Corporations,
http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/trends/vlO/corporationsG.html (showing that the audit rate
for all corporations has declined, and that large corporations providing investment
advice are less audited than other corporations, with only one in five audited in fiscal
years 2003-2004); Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Audits of Individual
Income Tax Returns, http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/trends/vlO/individualG.html (showing
that face-to-face audits of individual returns have declined).
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are outgunned by high-profile client representatives with deep
pockets to support research.
Taxpayers are often aware of resource limitations and may even
query advisors about audit risks. They may take aggressive tax
positions, but without adequate disclosure, in hopes that their returns
will not be audited. 92 This version of the audit lottery is successful for
large numbers of taxpayers solely because of the low audit statistics.
Since many large corporations are subject to continuous audits, they
cannot avoid audits altogether.93 Winning the audit lottery for them
means having their most defensible positions on the audit agenda and
having their more aggressive positions examined cursorily or not at
all.94
The audit lottery is facilitated by ethical rules that some read to
encourage attorneys to initiate advice about audit lottery advantages
or at the least to respond fully to clients' questions.95 Under the ABA
Model Rules, an advisor "may refer not only to law but to other
considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors,
that may be relevant to the client's situation., 96  In this context,
Respected attorney George Cooper envisioned a conversation contrasting a
professional approach to a cost-based approach.
It has to be a long shot to put any reliance on the expectation that you can
get away with a manipulation having these implications. That means...
that the probability of nondiscovery is critical to your recommendation.
There is nothing new or clever in seeing that playing this so-called audit
lottery is a winning game for the taxpayer.
George Cooper, The Avoidance Dynamic: A Tale of Tax Planning, Tax Ethics, and
Tax Reform, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1553, 1578 (1980) (excerpted in WOLFMAN ET AL.,
supra note 19, at 204-05).
93 See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Audit Rate for Large
Corporations Varies Markedly by Industry, http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/trends/vl0/
audindustryG.html (indicating large mining and manufacturing corporations are
essentially subject to a 100% audit rate, but noting substantially lower audit rates for
large financial institutions).
94 See 1 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., STUDY OF
PRESENT-LAW PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECrION 3801
OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM AcT OF 1998
(INCLUDING PROVISIONS RELATING To CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS), at 212 (Joint
Comm. Print 1999), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-3-99.pdf [hereinafter
PENALTY STUDY].
95 See, e.g., Joel S. Newman, The Audit Lottery: Don't Ask, Don't Tell?, 86 TAX
NOTES 1438 (Mar. 6, 2000) (arguing that it is appropriate to advise clients about audit
lottery).
96 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 2.1 (2003).
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practical considerations may be more important than narrow legal
advice. The obligation to report positions carries practical economic
implications: the Service is more likely to challenge a noted aggressive
position than a routine one. Is it therefore appropriate for lawyers to
explain that the audit lottery favors a client's ability to "get away
with" an aggressive transaction without having to litigate or concede it
at audit? ABA discussions in connection with the development of the
Model Rules support this view.
The right to have legal advice extends to persons who have
bad motives and purposes as well as those who have good
ones. As adviser, a lawyer is required to give an honest
opinion about the actual consequences that appear likely to
result from a client's conduct and not an opinion reflecting
what society might wish would be the consequences.97
The combination of limited enforcement resources, few audits in
less time under weaker investigatory circumstances, and an ethical
rule that supports advisors' alerting clients to audit lottery
practicalities forces the conclusion that even enhanced disclosure
requirements and stiffer penalties may not be sufficient to overcome
an aggressive taxpayer's audit lottery advantage. Part C suggests that
these problems are exacerbated by standards that govern taxpayers'
return positions and tax advisors' planning advice and evidentiary
privileges that affirmatively limit disclosure.
C. Practice Standards
Lack of disclosure is key to taxpayers' ability to exploit the audit
lottery. The primary means of affecting compliance in this era of low
enforcement resources and an "economically rational 'audit lottery'
discount 98 has been to combat directly the lack of transparency that is
structured into complex avoidance transactions.
97 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.3 cmt. (Discussion Draft 1980)
(emphasis added).
98 Robert A. Rizzi, Tax Shelters Invade: Corporate Transactions and the Anti-
Shelter Crusade, CORP. TAX'N, Jul.-Aug. 2004, at 22 (discussing Treasury's "market
theory of tax shelters").
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1. Statutory Standards
In the 1980s, Congress adopted shelter registration requirements,
but the penalties were insubstantial and compliance was spotty.99 In
1997, Congress and Treasury began the current effort to discourage
abusive shelters through enhanced sanctions and disclosure, starting
with the expansion of registration to cover promoted confidential
transactions that had a significant purpose of tax avoidance. '°°
President Clinton's FY2000 budget included anti-shelter provisions, '
and Treasury issued proposed and temporary regulations, finalized in
2003, that identified six categories of so-called "reportable
transactions" viewed as having a potential for tax avoidance
(including "listed transactions" identified as abusive by the Service
and transactions subject to confidentiality agreements).' °2
99 Former section 6111 required organizers to register shelters, originally defined
to cover then-current investment shelters. See I.R.C. §§ 6111(d) (1997) (applying to
significant purpose transactions offered under confidential terms in which promoter
earned fees in excess of $100,000), 6111(c) (1984) (applying to certain investments
with a high ratio of deductions and credits to base investment). Former section 6112
required shelter promoters to maintain lists of investors. See I.R.C. § 6112 (1984)
(repealed by the 2004 Jobs Act) (applying generally to registration-required shelters
and to other arrangements determined under regulations to have potential for tax
avoidance). Penalty provisions were insubstantial. I.R.C. § 6700 (as enacted in 1982
and amended in 1984 and 1989) (generally imposing a $1,000 promoter penalty). In
2004, the promoter penalty was significantly increased. See infra note 104 and
accompanying text. The aiding and abetting penalty remains insubstantial. I.R.C.
§ 6701 (as enacted in 1982 and amended in 1989) (generally imposing a $1,000
penalty, or $10,000 for corporate taxpayers, for aiding and abetting).
100 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1028, 111 Stat. 788, 926
(1997); I.R.C. § 6111(d) (2004). Studies conducted in 1999 by Treasury and the Joint
Committee on Taxation were instrumental in spurring reforms. See DEPT. OF THE
TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS
AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS (1999), http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/
library/ctswhite.pdf; PENALTY STUDY, supra note 94, at 173-250 (identifying
corporate tax shelter characteristics, causes, and ways to enhance sanctions).
101 DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION'S REVENUE PROPOSALS 95-105 (1999), http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases/docs/grnbk99.pdf.
102 See T.D. 9017, 2002-2 C.B. 815 (disclosure requirements); T.D. 9018, 2002-2
C.B. 823 (list maintenance requirements applicable to "material advisors"); T.D.
9046, 2003-1 C.B. 614 (finalizing regulations); I.R.S. Ann. 2000-1, 2000-1 C.B. 294
(announcing release). Included in the reportable transactions are: listed transactions
identified by the Treasury and certain confidentially marketed, contractually-
protected-fee, loss, divergent book-tax, and tax credit transactions. Once the
confidentiality factor became a trigger for disclosure (for transactions with adviser
fees of $250,000 or more, in the aggregate), aggressive tax planners likely began doing
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Although the reportable transaction regulations were intended to
change the cost-benefit analysis by making misreporting riskier, the
lack of penalties rendered them ineffective.03 Expansion of abusive
planning from corporations to wealthy individuals finally led Congress
to act. The 2004 Jobs Act codified the reportable transaction rules,
with some changes, and created new penalty categories for taxpayers
and "material advisors. ' 1°4 These changes increased the likelihood of
discovery of abusive transactions and of taxpayer or advisor
penalties.10 5  Codification also demonstrated the importance that
Congress places on strengthening the transparency regime to reduce
detection avoidance, even though the final changes did not reach
nonshelter transactions, as proposed by the Senate.' °6
similar transactions with transaction documents that disclaimed any confidentiality
requirement so that they could "remain confidential in fact." Rizzi, supra note 98, at
23; see Beale, SEC Heat, supra note 6, at 251-54 (discussing regulations).
103 See, e.g., Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Jobs Act Penalty Provisions
and Tax Practitioners, 105 TAx NOTES 675, 675 (Nov. 1, 2004) (indicating that "the
absence of meaningful penalties.., meant that practitioners tended to assume their
clients were not participating in abusive tax shelter transactions and ignored the
whole subject").
104 2004 Jobs Act §§ 812, 815-16, 819; I.R.C. §§ 6111-12, 6662, 6662A, 6664, 6707
(2004). The former registration and list rules were replaced with rules requiring
material advisors to report reportable transactions and maintain lists of investors. See
I.R.C. §§ 6111 (material advisor reporting requirement, defining material advisor as
persons who advise or assist in planning or implementing reportable transactions for
fees of at least $50,000 for individuals or $250,000 if advising an entity), 6112 (material
advisor list maintenance requirement). Existing penalties were increased and new
penalties added for material advisor reporting and list maintenance requirements and
for taxpayer reportable transaction reporting requirements. See I.R.C. §§ 6662A
(new taxpayer 20% understatement penalty for reportable transactions with
significant tax avoidance purposes, increased to 30% if not disclosed), 6700 (organizer
penalty for a false statement increased from $1,000 to 50% of the gross income
derived from the activity), 6707 (new penalty replacing $500 penalty for failure to
register with penalty for failure to report reportable transactions of $50,000 (or
$200,000 or 50% of gross income derived, for listed transactions)), 6707A (new
taxpayer penalty for failure to report a reportable transaction, ranging from $10,000
to $200,000), 6708 (new penalty replacing $50 penalty for failure to maintain lists
under § 6112 with $10,000 a day penalty for failure to turn over information after
twenty days, without reasonable cause).
105 Herbert N. Beller, The New Penalty Regime Finally Arrives: Proceed with
Caution!, 56 TAX ExEcuTiVE 486, 491 (2004) (possibility of substantial penalties
difficult to ignore).
106 The Senate version would also have replaced the general "realistic possibility
of success" undisclosed position standard for return preparers, I.R.C. § 6694(a), with a
"more likely than not" standard, and would have replaced the "not frivolous"
disclosed position standard for preparers, I.R.C. § 6694(a)(3), with a "reasonable
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The 2004 Jobs Act also stiffened reporting requirements for most
transactions that have a significant tax avoidance purpose (significant
purpose transactions or SPTs). Prior to the Act, a noncorporate
taxpayer's substantial underpayment penalty for an SPT would be
reduced if the taxpayer had substantial authority and the taxpayer
reasonably believed that the position was more likely than not correct
(without, under regulations, taking the audit lottery into account).10
7
That reduction was not available to corporate taxpayers, but both
corporate and noncorporate taxpayers could affirmatively defend
against the penalty if they could establish reasonable cause and good
faith, which often meant reliance on a favorable practitioner
opinion. 08
After the 2004 Jobs Act, the new substantial understatement
penalty with respect to reportable transactions that are listed or
SPTs1°9 can be avoided (for corporations or individuals) only if the
taxpayer satisfies a more stringent affirmative defense requirement,
summarized as follows:
1. the position must be adequately disclosed;"0
2. the position must be based on substantial authority;"'
3. the taxpayer must reasonably believe that the position is
more likely than not (MLTN) correct;1
4. to be reasonable, the taxpayer's belief must be based on
the facts and law at the time the return is filed and must
not take the audit lottery or settlement potential into
account;"13
5. if the taxpayer relies on a tax advisor's opinion, it must not
basis" standard paralleling the standard for taxpayers to avoid the section 6662
understatement penalty. S. 1637, 108th Cong. § 405 (2004); see Burgess J.W. Raby &
William L. Raby, Frivolity, Tax Practitioners, and the Tax Law, 106 TAx NOTES 561
(Jan. 31, 2005) (discussing failure of Senate proposal and problem of continuing gap
between taxpayer and return preparer standards).
107 I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(i)(II) (prior to the 2004 Jobs Act); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6662-4(g)(1), (4). Standards for nonshelter transactions (defined as transactions
not having a significant tax avoidance purpose) were lower: a "substantial authority"
standard for nondisclosed positions, I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i), and a low "reasonable
basis" standard for disclosed positions. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii).
108 I.R.C. § 6664(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4.
109 I.R.C. § 6662A.
110 I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2)(A).
111 I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2)(B).
112 I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2)(C).
113 I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3)(A).
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be based on unreasonable assumptions, fail to discuss
relevant facts or unreasonably rely on taxpayer or third
party representations (the "disqualified tax opinion"
rule);1 1 4 and
6. advisors and all members of their firms on whose opinion
a taxpayer relies for penalty protection purposes must be
divorced from the structuring and implementation of the
transaction or arrangement that is the subject of the
opinion (the "disqualified tax advisor" rule). 15
As a result, a taxpayer who wishes to have a tax expert develop a
structure and deal with each potential tax issue as it arises can rely on
that tax advisor's opinion only in the sense that the advisor's expertise
and views as to probability of success provide some assurance that the
position is sustainable. If the taxpayer desires something more
substantial - i.e., an opinion that may deflect penalties by
establishing substantial authority for a position that is MLTN correct,
the taxpayer must engage a second tax advisor from another firm who
cannot materially modify the transaction.u6 This creates a dilemma
that should discourage abusive transactions, in that the cost of
engaging in an avoidance transaction is significantly increased if the
taxpayer wishes to have a penalty protection opinion, yet the second
advisor may not be able to provide a satisfactory penalty protection
opinion because of flaws in the structure unnoticed by the first
advisor.
These restrictions may help deter the cloned shelters that
accounting and law firms promoted during the 1990s. If a taxpayer
engages an independent advisor who is able to give an opinion that
satisfies the 2004 Jobs Act standards, then it is likely that the
transaction has more merit than expected."' On the other hand, a
114 I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3)(B)(i), (iii).
115 I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3)(B)(i), (ii).
116 See, e.g., Belier, supra note 105, at 489 (noting that having second advisor who
could not suggest structure modifications "would represent a sea change in the way
that tax practitioners traditionally operate in connection with the rendering of tax
opinions").
117 The statement in the text assumes, of course, that there is no pattern of
reciprocity or explicit collusion among groups of tax advisors in such situations. In
other words, if tax advisor A were to structure a transaction and tax advisor B were to
provide an opinion supporting the availability of the desired tax benefits from the
transaction, the value of B's opinion may be undermined by a pattern of reciprocity
between A and B whereby B generally affirms the benefits for transactions structured
by A and A generally affirms the benefits for transactions structured by B. In the
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cloned opinion produced by a promoter who structures a reportable
SPT is worthless as penalty protection. Furthermore, cloning and
marketing activities subject to the material advisor reporting rules are
more likely to be reported because of the substantial penalties for
failure to report. Combined with the enhanced penalties for
improper reporting, this limitation on the use of opinions from those
who help to structure transactions changes the cost-benefit balance in
.. 119
favor of more conservative reporting.
The disqualified tax advisor rule could be understood to
categorize an opinion from a tax advisor who participates in the
planning and implementation of a transaction more as business advice
than as legal advice. That clearly fits the marketed opinions in the
Merrill Lynch shelters. These opinions were a commodity offered for
sale to buyers whose tax situations (e.g., unrelated capital gains)
predisposed them to accept the sales pitch and enter into the
marketed transaction structure. The rule may also apply to
customized planning under the new "profit center" model of tax
departments, where advisors design solutions to tax problems that fit
the business context.
The new restrictions, however, may have less impact (other than
cost and attorney disgruntlement) on customized tax planning
involving reportable SPTs. In customized transactions, tax advisors
work alongside bankers, bankruptcy experts, and corporate advisors
to shape and fine-tune a proposed transaction until each different
legal regime's requirements are satisfied. Tax advisors provide
suggestions about business purpose, enhancing economic substance,
and additional document provisions to comply with regulations -
even though the deal cash flows may not realistically be expected to
trigger the application of the provisions, as in the Castle Harbour
corporate scandals that came to light beginning with Enron, there is evidence of such
reciprocal support among both accounting firms and law firms.
118 See I.R.C. §§ 6707 (advisor failure to furnish information on reportable
transactions subject to a minimum $50,000 fine, increased for listed transactions to as
much as $200,000), 6707A (taxpayer failure to report a reportable transaction subject
to a minimum $10,000 fine for individuals and $50,000 fine for entities, increased for
listed transactions to $100,000 and $200,000, respectively).
"' See, e.g., Richard M. Lipton, Reliance on Tax Opinions: The World Changes
Due to Long Term Capital Holdings and the AJCA, 101 J. TAX'N 344, 344 (2004)
(suggesting that 2004 Jobs Act rules and Long Term Capital Holdings decision
discounting respected firms' opinions "change all of the operating assumptions that
most taxpayers (and their advisors) have relied on for many years in assessing
whether the IRS is likely to impose penalties").
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extraordinary loss allocation provisions. 120  Taxpayers purchase the
basic idea for dealing with a tax problem (exhaustion of depreciation
allowances, in the case of the Castle Harbour deal) and the planning
assistance to see the idea through, rather than a penalty-protection
opinion. 1' Accordingly, further changes will be necessary to ensure a
more balanced tax minimization norm.
2. Circular 230
A separate set of standards, commonly referred to as Circular
230, governs practice before the Service.122 Final regulations in 1994
adopted the "realistic possibility" litigation-based standard for signing
return preparers, but did not otherwise change requirements for
shelter advice.1 23 Treasury proposed various amendments in 2001,• • 124
including new opinion standards for shelter opinions, but finalized
the regulations in 2002 without those requirements.'2 Modifications
120 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
121 James M. Peaslee, Circular 230: Make Room for Informal Written Advice, 106
TAX NoTEs 1457, 1459 (Mar. 21, 2005) (noting that taxpayers "want their advisers to
serve as a filter, to tell them where the real risks are and how they can be addressed
(including how a transaction could be planned or changed to minimize risks)").
122 31 C.F.R. pt. 10 (2005) [hereinafter Circular 230]. Circular 230 defines
"practice before the Internal Revenue Service" broadly to include "all matters
connected with a presentation to the Internal Revenue Service or any of its officers or
employees." 31 C.F.R. § 10.2(d). Although there may be a technical argument that
some tax opinions would not be covered because Circular 230 does not explicitly
include tax advice to taxpayers, James P. Holden, Dealing with the Aggressive
Corporate Tax Shelter Problem, 82 TAX NoTEs 707, 710-11 (Feb. 1, 1999), or because
an attorney has not actually filed a power of attorney to practice before the Service,
Arthur L. Bailey & Alexis A. MacIvor, New Circular 230 Regulations Impose Strict
Standards for Tax Practitioners, 57 TAX EXECUTIVE 28 (2005), advisors will likely
conform because of the potential relevance of any opinion to a tax controversy.
123 T.D. 8545, 1994-2 C.B. 415. Signing return preparers may generally
recommend positions that do not have a realistic possibility of being sustained on the
merits only if the position is adequately disclosed. I.R.C. § 6694(a). A nonsigning
preparer may recommend a position that is merely nonfrivolous, even if it is not
disclosed on the taxpayer's return, so long as the preparer advises the taxpayer that
the position lacks substantial authority and adequate disclosure could avoid a penalty.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(3)(ii)(A). Tax shelter opinion rules were added to Circular
230 in 1984 but targeted the earlier shelters of the 1970s and 1980s. See Lipton &
Dixon, supra note 47, at 137 (noting that 1984 shelter provisions were "aimed at
transactions that no longer exist"); supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
124 Prop. Treas. Reg. 31 C.F.R. pt. 10, 66 Fed. Reg. 3276 (Jan. 12, 2001).
125 T.D. 9011, 2002-2 C.B. 356.
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were again proposed in December 2003126 and finalized with changes
127in December 2004. Further changes, providing additional
exceptions, were promulgated in mid-2005 in response to commentary
from practitioners that the regulations as finalized would have
128
unintended consequences for ordinary opinion practice.
The new Circular 230 opinion standards are quite detailed,
though the basic opinion practices underlying the changes (e.g.,
thorough consideration of law and facts, rejection of unrealistic
assumptions) are not substantially different from that which has
traditionally been considered good lawyering. The amendments
.• 129
include a section of aspirational best practices and two new sets of
rules governing written tax opinions: those for covered opinions13 ° and
those for other written opinions (referred to here as noncovered• • 131
opinions). Opinions that would otherwise be treated as covered
opinions in some cases may be converted to noncovered opinions with
disclaimers. 112 The rules are intended to "target ... written advice that
present[s] a significant cause for concern and avoid undue
interference with the practitioner-client relationship.' ' 133 They require
grounding opinions in the actual factual situation of the client rather
than relying on assumptions about the applicable facts. An advisor is
expected to verify that a client is engaging in a business transaction by
asking for, and evaluating the weight of, the client's actual business
purpose for entering into a transaction.
126 Prop. Treas. Reg. 31 C.F.R. pt. 10, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,186 (Dec. 30, 2003)
(proposing best practices and opinion standards applicable to any written advice
concerning tax shelter items, where tax shelters are defined as any arrangement with a
significant purpose of tax avoidance).
127 T.D. 9165, 2005-4 I.R.B. 357 (including aspirational best practices and
standards for covered opinions and all other written opinions not specifically
exempted).
128 T.D. 9201, 2005-23 I.R.B. 1153.
129 31 C.F.R. § 10.33 (2005) (aspirational standards caution tax practitioners to
avoid unreasonable factual or legal assumptions or unreasonable reliance on
representations or statements from a taxpayer or third party and not to base
conclusion as to possibility of success on probability of being audited, of position
being discovered on audit or of settlement).
130 31 C.F.R. § 10.35.
131 31 C.F.R. § 10.37.
132 Disclaimers must be in a separate section and in at least the same type size as
the discussion sections so that they are "readily apparent" under the applicable facts
and circumstances, including taxpayer sophistication and opinion length. 31 C.F.R.
§ 10.35(b)(8).
133 I.R.S. News Release IR-2004-152 (Dec. 17, 2004).
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The covered opinion standards apply to listed transactions,
transactions for which the principal purpose is tax avoidance, and
certain SPTs.im A transaction will not be treated as having a principal
purpose of tax avoidance if the tax benefits are claimed consistently
with the statute and congressional purpose, what practitioners
sometimes call the "slam dunk" case of conforming to congressional
intent. 13  Opinions in respect of listed and principal purpose
transactions are per se covered opinions. SPT opinions will be
covered opinions if they are marketed, reliance, contractually
protected or confidential opinions.
13 6
A marketed opinion is one that is expected to be used by
someone other than the practitioner (or practitioner's firm) to
promote, market or recommend an arrangement. 137  Marketed
opinions without a "no-reliance" disclaimer are covered opinions and
cannot be provided unless they reach a MLTN confidence level as to
the overall conclusion and as to each significant tax issue."' Marketed
opinions with a no-reliance disclaimer cannot provide penalty
protection for taxpayers.
Reliance opinions are also covered opinions: they provide an
opinion at the MLTN confidence level as to at least one significant
federal tax issue and do not provide penalty protection as to issues
139that do not reach the MLTN level. SPT opinions that would
otherwise be reliance opinions because they reach a MLTN
confidence level can satisfy the less strict standards for noncovered
opinions only if they carry a disclaimer indicating that they cannot be
relied upon for penalty protection) 4°
134 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i).
135 A principal purpose of tax avoidance is defined, as in regulations under
section 6664, as one for which the tax avoidance purpose exceeds any other purpose,
excluding transactions for which benefits are "consistent with the statute and
Congressional purpose." 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-
4(g)(2)(i)-(ii).
136 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C).
137 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(5)(i).
138 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(5) (disclaimer requirements for noncovered marketed
opinion), (c)(3)(iv) (requiring MLTN conclusion for each significant tax issue),
(c)(4)(ii) (requiring overall MLTN conclusion), (e)(2) (requiring disclosure that
marketed opinion was written to promote transaction and that taxpayer should
consult independent advisor).
139 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4)(i) (definition of reliance opinion), (e)(4) (prohibiting
reliance on covered opinions for significant federal tax issues at less than MLTN
confidence level).
140 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4)(ii).
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The remaining categories of covered SPT opinions - opinions
subject to conditions of confidentiality or subject to contractual
protection - are relatively straight-forward. They are defined
similarly to those categories under the reportable transaction
regulations and are per se covered opinions. 4 '
If any covered opinion does not reach a MLTN conclusion in
respect of any significant tax issue, that fact must be disclosed
prominently and the opinion will not provide penalty protection for
142
that issue. All covered opinions must reach an overall conclusion or
explain why no overall conclusion can be reached.1
43
Under Circular 230, SPT opinions that are not marketed opinions,
do not reach a MLTN confidence level, and are not issued for listed,
principal purpose, confidential or contractually-protected-fee
transactions are noncovered opinions subject to less stringent
standards. Thus, advice opining that there is substantial authority for
a taxpayer's position, but at a confidence level less than MLTN and
without the no-reliance disclaimer, would be permitted under the
Circular 230 noncovered opinion rules in respect of some SPTs. Such
an opinion would nonetheless fail to provide penalty protection
against the reportable transaction understatement penalty if the SPT
were a reportable transaction, because the section 6664(d) reasonable
cause defense for reportable SPTs requires a MLTN level of
confidence.'" Furthermore, even though the 2004 Jobs Act
141 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(6) (defining conditions of confidentiality to cover
limitations on disclosure of tax strategies), (b)(7) (defining contractual protection as
right to refund of advisor fees if intended tax consequences are not sustained or as fee
arrangement contingent on realization of tax benefits).
142 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(ii), (e)(4).
143 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(4).
1" I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2)(C). This anomaly results from a lack of symmetry
between Circular 230 categories, reportable transaction penalties and defenses
codified in the 2004 Jobs Act and the former definition of tax shelters as SPTs in the
section 6662 understatement penalty provision and in the section 6664 affirmative
defense. Prior to the 2004 amendments, a taxpayer would need to show both
substantial authority and a MLTN confidence level to eliminate the ordinary
understatement penalty in respect of an SPT. See I.R.C. §§ 6662(d)(1)(C) (2003)
(requiring noncorporate taxpayers to show substantial authority and MLTN to
"reduce" penalty in respect of a tax shelter item), 6664(d) (requiring corporate
taxpayers to show substantial authority and MLTN to affirmatively defend against
penalty in respect of a tax shelter item); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(f)(2) (same). After
the 2004 Jobs Act, SPTs that are not reportable are penalizable under section 6662
and not under the new section 6662A with its stiffer affirmative defense. I.R.C.
§ 6662A (as added in 2004) (new penalty for reportable SPTs); I.R.C. § 6664(d) (as
amended in 2004) (affirmative defense for reportable SPTs). Although substantial
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amendments do not raise standards under section 6694 for
practitioners who advise in respect of tax return positions (i.e., the
realistic possibility standard still applies), practitioners will
nonetheless need to provide MLTN assessments to avoid violating
Circular 230 whenever a written opinion is provided for penalty
protection purposes as to a significant federal tax issue in a transaction
• • 141
that requires a covered opinion.
There is a significant exception, however, that diminishes the
covered opinion requirement. Reliance opinions and opinions for
transactions with confidentiality requirements or contractual fee
protection may be offered as "limited scope" opinions. This
subcategory of covered opinions permits advisors to address selected
issues and assume factual and legal issues that are important to the
authority cannot prevent application of the regular understatement penalty to any
taxpayers in respect of SPTs, I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (as amended in 2004)
(eliminating possibility of reducing penalty for SPTs), taxpayers who engage in SPTs
that are not reportable transactions may nonetheless be able to rely upon substantial
authority opinions that do not reach a MLTN confidence level to claim the ordinary
reasonable cause affirmative defense. I.R.C. § 6664(c) (affirmative defense to section
6662 penalty, which no longer includes special rules for SPTs). Thus, if a covered
opinion is not required under Circular 230 (because the transaction is not
confidential, contractually protected, listed or a principal purpose transaction) and
the transaction is not reportable, then the ordinary section 6662 penalty and section
6664 reasonable cause defense apply.
The section 6664 regulations have not yet been amended: they retain the older
"tax shelter" definition (referencing former section 6662, which originally defined
shelters as principal purpose transactions and then later was amended to define
shelters as SPTs) and still require substantial authority and MLTN confidence level to
demonstrate reasonable cause based on reasonable reliance on an opinion. Treas.
Reg. § 1.6664-4(f)(2). Accordingly, the Service might assert that the regulatory
regime still applies to SPTs that are not reportable transactions, and are subject to the
ordinary section 6662 understatement penalty, to require a MLTN level of opinion to
demonstrate reasonable cause in reliance on a tax advisor.
Circular 230 appropriately excepts from covered reliance opinion treatment
those opinions regarding SPTs that do not raise a significant federal tax issue because
the Service would have no reasonable basis for a challenge. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(3).
Opinions on those issues should be at a very high ("will") level of confidence.
Negative opinions are excluded altogether from the covered opinion requirements
(i.e., even for listed, principal purpose, confidential or contractually-protected-fee
transactions), but that exclusion is inapplicable if the opinion reaches any positive
confidence level. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(ii). An opinion that such a transaction has
some chance of success less than MLTN in respect of a significant federal tax issue is a
covered opinion, and cannot provide penalty protection on that issue since it is not at
a MLTN level of confidence. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(e).
145 31 C.F.R. § 10.37(e)(4).
[Vol. 25:583
2006] Tax Advice Before the Return
transaction, with appropriate disclosure.'4
Several other types of advice are also excepted, including
preliminary opinions."' A lawyer who provides only oral advice on
structuring and reporting a transaction need not satisfy the covered
opinion requirements. Negative advice and advice from in-house
counsel are excepted from the covered opinion requirements.
48
Perhaps most significantly, post-return advice is not a covered
opinion, unless the attorney has reason to know that the taxpayer will
rely on the opinion in taking a return position after the opinion's
date. 49
In summary, the statutory and regulatory changes now set
stringent requirements for the reasonable cause affirmative defense
for reportable SPTs. The defense will only be available if there is
adequate disclosure, substantial authority, and a reasonable belief that
the position is MLTN correct. That belief cannot be based on the
advice of a tax advisor who served as a material advisor in the
development or marketing of the structure. If a written opinion is
146 See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(3)(v) (permitting limited scope opinions), (e)(3)
(requiring disclaimers noting limited scope, possibility of additional issues, and
inability to rely on opinion for issues not within its scope).
147 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(A).
148 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(D)-(E); see supra note 144 (discussing negative
advice).
149 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(ii)(C).
150 There is a peculiar gap between Circular 230 and the Code. See supra note
144 and accompanying text. After amendment, the ordinary understatement penalty
is a strict liability penalty that is not subject to reduction for tax shelters, defined as
SPTs. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C). The tax shelter understatement penalty and the tax
shelter affirmative defense apply only to listed transactions and to reportable
transactions that are SPTs. I.R.C. §§ 6662A (penalty), 6664(d) (affirmative defense).
Circular 230 applies to listed, principal purpose and significant purpose transactions.
Listed transactions are always reportable, but the latter two categories may or may
not also be reportable transactions under the regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)
(2005). SPTs that are not reportable could therefore be subject to the Circular 230
covered opinion rules, be subject to penalty under section 6662 rather than section
6662A, not be eligible for reduction under the section 6662 substantial authority
standard because they are SPTs, yet still be eligible for the ordinary section 6664(c)
affirmative defense (reasonable cause/good faith belief) without the 2004 Jobs Act
additional requirements. An opinion for such a transaction could therefore fail to
reach the MLTN level (unless the former tax shelter regulation is still considered
validly applied to such transactions) and not satisfy the disqualified advisor rules yet
still provide penalty protection. This anomaly results from the Code's use of the
reportable transaction categories to limit the reach of the former section 6662 tax
shelter definition, and adds both complexity and potential for avoidance transactions
to slip through the cracks.
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relied upon, it cannot make unreasonable factual representations or
assumptions and, assuming that the advisor practices before the
Service, it must also satisfy more stringent Circular 230 opinion
requirements."'
Commentators have objected to the broad scope of the Circular
230 opinion requirements, suggesting that they may damage the
relationship between tax lawyers and clients, complicate tax practice,
and represent a radical change in applicable standards. 112 The use of
significant tax avoidance to define the scope of covered transactions
suggests that the Circular 230 standards could cover almost any
transaction that provides a substantial tax benefit. That led at least
one commentator to aver that now "[e]verything is a shelter."'53
151 Concurrent changes to auditor provision of tax services for SEC reporting
companies support the paradigm shift noted here. I earlier recommended that the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) incorporate the Service's
reportable transaction categories to ban auditor tax services and that it require
sharing of information about aggressive tax transactions with company boards and the
public. Beale, SEC Heat, supra note 6, at 241, 259. The 2004 Jobs Act included a
provision requiring public companies to disclose certain tax penalties in their SEC
reports. 2004 Jobs Act § 811(a) (adding I.R.C. § 6707A(e)); see also Rev. Proc. 2005-
51, 2005-33 I.R.B. 296 (providing guidance on penalty reporting). The PCAOB has
also adopted rules restricting tax services along the lines suggested in the referenced
article. PUB. Co. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., PCAOB RELEASE No. 2005-014,
ETHICS AND INDEPENDENCE RULES CONCERNING INDEPENDENCE, TAX SERVICES,
AND CONTINGENT FEES (2005), http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Docket_017/2005-07-
26_Release_2004-014.pdf (restricting auditors of public companies from providing tax
advice on listed and confidential transactions, and banning SPT advice unless auditor
can reach MLTN confidence level). The Financial Accounting Standards Board has
also released an exposure draft adjusting accounting for uncertain tax positions in
ways that may well flag aggressive transactions for company boards and the Service.
FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FILE REF. No. 1215-001, EXPOSURE DRAFT,
ACCOUNTING FOR UNCERTAIN TAX POSITIONS (2005), http://www.fasb.org/draft/
index.shtml.
152 Sheryl Stratton, Circular 230 Regs "Federalize" Tax Practice, Treasury Told,
TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan 14, 2005) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2005
TNT 10-2) (reporting views of Julian Kim of Latham & Watkins); see also Belier,
supra note 116, at 491; Dan W. Holbrook, Imagine the Worst the U.S. Treasury Could
Do to Us - They've Done It: Revenge of the IRS: Circular 230 Changes Law Practice,
TENN. B.J., Aug. 2005, at 28, 30 (claiming rules "will drive a wedge between
taxpayer[s] and professional advisor[s]," lead to "intimidation tactics" and cause
clients to ask insurance salesmen for tax advice); Sheryl Stratton, Tax Officials Spar
with Tax Bar over Circular 230, 107 TAX NOTES 1082, 1082-84 (May 30, 2005) (noting
complaints that rules are "irrational" "impediments to practice").
153 Lee A. Sheppard, Shelter Penalties: Or Else What? Part 3, TAX NOTES TODAY
(Feb. 15, 2005) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2005 TNT 30-5) (noting
scope of Circular 230 definitions of tax avoidance transaction and significant federal
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Others suggest that advisors may simply ignore the rules through
''pervasive noncompliance" or drive taxpayer-clients away through
the high costs of overcompliance.
The concerns about impacting client relationships seem
overblown. Clients will continue to use advisors to structure ordinary
business transactions tax-efficiently. To the extent that they hesitate
to engage an attorney for primarily tax-motivated planning because of
their concerns about the costs implied by the two-advisor requirement
or the additional scrutiny and potential penalties that may apply
because of the now-codified reporting requirements, that is a net
social good. Abusive shelter planning and tax customization rob the
fisc and push compliance rates down while creating significant fairness
concerns and perpetuating distorted practice norms.
The noncompliance response, however, raises a significant
enforcement concern. The Circular 230 provisions are mandatory,
and practitioners in charge of a firm's tax practice may be subject to!. 155
discipline for failure to ensure compliance. Opinions, however, are
not routinely provided to the Service as an attachment to tax returns
or at the beginning of audits. Much attorney tax advice is likely
privileged and, at least in some circuits, protected under the work
product doctrine."' Accordingly, except in those cases when the
Service is offered a tax opinion as evidence of a good faith effort to
comply with the law, the Service will not be able to assess advisor
compliance. Even if the Service becomes aware of a failure to comply,
it may not have sufficient resources to pursue disciplinary action. The
past culture of inadequate Circular 230 enforcement may continue inS157
spite of these higher standards. Members of the bar are
undoubtedly taking the new requirements seriously, but with a clear
awareness of the Service's difficulty in policing the new rules absent
tax issue).
154 Lipton & Dixon, supra note 47, at 141.
155 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.35(a) (2005) (stating opinion giver's compliance as
mandatory), 10.36(a) (2005) (requiring practitioner in charge of firm's tax practice to
"take reasonable steps to ensure that the firm has adequate procedures in effect" and
subjecting to discipline under a gross incompetence standard for failing to take steps
to create procedures or to take action when practitioner "knows or should know" of
noncompliance).
156 See infra Part II.C.4.
157 See, e.g., Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Confidence Levels, Circular
230, and Practitioner Penalties, 106 TAX NOTES 187, 190 (Jan. 10, 2005) (noting
Service has not vigorously enforced Circular 230 in the past and suggesting that any






The development of legal ethics can be summarized briefly.
The American Bar Association (ABA) promulgated Canons of
Professional Ethics in 1908. In 1969, the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility replaced the Canons, combining aspirational
statements with mandatory disciplinary rules. In 1983, the Model
Rules, providing authoritative rules and explanatory comments, were
adopted by the Tax Court and most states. To provide interpretive
guidance, the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility promulgates general ethics opinions,9 and its
Standards of Tax Practice Committee addresses issues of concern to
tax practitioners.'6 These rules, of course, do not have legal force of
themselves; as a result, the ABA rules are akin to a restatement or
model act. They acquire legal force only upon adoption, in whole or
in part, by a particular state as part of that state's regulation of
attorneys.
A Code of Professional Conduct (CPC) established by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) governs
accountants.16 Like the legal standards, the CPC includes principles
that set aspirational standards of integrity, objectivity and due care, as
well as mandatory rules establishing minimal levels of conduct.
Interpretations, rulings and aspirational Statements on Standards for
Tax Services supplement the CPC.
a. Duties of Loyalty and Confidentiality
This brief history encompasses a "profound transformation in
lawyer ideology from the self-image of a free professional to the self-
image of a zealous advocate" serving as "mere agents of their
clients." 62  At the core of this transformation are strong fiduciary
158 This summary is based on WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 5-7.
159 In tax, the two most significant opinions are ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982) (applicable to marketed shelters), and ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Opinion 85-352 (1985) (generally
applicable).
160 See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Standards of Tax Practice, Statement 2000-1 (2000),
http://www.abanet.org/tax/groups/stp/stmt0-1 .html.
161 Am. Inst. of Certifed Pub. Accountants, AICPA Code of Prof' Conduct,
http://www.aicpa.org/about/code/index.html.
162 Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal
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duties of loyalty to the client and confidentiality that require an
attorney to aggressively pursue a client's interests and maintain in
strict confidence all communications that a client has shared in theS 163
course of representation. The duties of loyalty and confidentiality
are said to serve the public interest: the knowledge that attorneys will
provide conflict-free, independent advice without betraying
confidences may encourage clients to seek out legal assistance that
helps them comply with the law. 64 The ABA has consistently
protected the rights of attorneys to counsel clients about the potential
risks of alternative courses of action, resisting any pressure to require
attorneys to "resolv[e] all doubts in favor of regulatory restrictions.' 165
The presupposition is that a lesser loyalty to clients, or limitation on
the duty to assist clients in carrying out their objectives (other than
the prohibition against helping a client to commit fraud) could lead
attorneys to put their own personal circumstances above clients'
needs.' 66
The formal tax opinions promulgated by the ABA reinforce this
161
view of tax practitioners, in spite of what appear to be profound
differences between the tax self-assessment context and other public
contexts where legal representation is necessary, such as securities
regulation.168 Securities regulation serves a public benefit by creating
Ethics - H The Modem Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 210, 222 (2002).
Wolfram attributes the change to "stronger associations with fewer clients through
law-firm practice and.., the increasingly dominant commercial visions of a society."
Id. at 220; see also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993) (noting decline of professional attributes).
163 See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
LAWYERING 204 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing consequentialist view of confidentiality);
James Fischer, External Control over the American Bar, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
(forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 78-79, on file with author) (similar); Lloyd B.
Snyder, Is Attorney-Client Confidentiality Necessary?, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 477
(2002) (discussing origins and purposes of confidentiality duty).
164 House of Delegates Meets in Montreal, 61 A.B.A. J. 1079, 1085-86 (1975).
165 Id. at 1086.
166 See id. (The client's options "should not be improperly narrowed through the
insistence of an attorney who may, perhaps unconsciously, eliminate available choices
from consideration because of his concern over possible personal risks if the position
is taken which, though supportable, is subject to uncertainty or contrary to a known,
but perhaps erroneous, position.").
167 See Watson, supra note 77, at 1210-13, 1236-37 (evaluating issues that would
be decided differently if lawyers owed a special duty to tax system and concluding
that an enforceable normative standard is needed because an ideal duty cannot
discourage aggressive tax minimization planning).
"'8 See also infra notes 199-205 (drawing out distinctions in more detail).
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more transparent markets where public investors receive sufficient
information to invest successfully without being taken for a ride by
insiders with critical information on particular entities.' 69 Tax rules
serve a similar public benefit by establishing a relatively transparent
system of taxation so that taxpayers can comply relatively easily with
their tax reporting obligation. Tax rules, however, are also
indispensable to the collection of revenues necessary to fund
government programs. Thus, there is a decidedly strong public
interest component to the tax regime that may not be comparable to
any other public context.
Ethical standards for tax opinions do not adequately reflect this
strong public interest. Formal Opinion 314, an early opinion dealing
with tax standards, required only a reasonable basis for tax advice. It
failed to draw clear distinctions among the advisor, advocate and
return preparer roles, ultimately concluding that lawyers owe the
Service no more deference than to any other adverse party. 70 Formal
Opinion 346, promulgated in 1982, provided best practice guidelines
for promoted tax shelter opinions similar to those included in Circular
230. Tax opinions used in promoting shelters violated the guidelines
only if they knowingly or through gross incompetence disregarded or
minimized serious legal risks or misstated the facts or law."'
Promulgated in the context of an expectation that Treasury would
strengthen the opinion standards for practice before the Service, the
ABA's Formal Opinion 85-352 moved from a reasonable basis or "not
frivolous" standard to a slightly higher litigation-based standard for
tax practice, still treating the relationship between attorneys and the
169 The visibility of lawyers in Enron and other financial scandals energized calls
for greater transparency in lawyer regulation. See, e.g., Geoffrey Hazard Jr.,
Removing Gag Rules for Lawyers? Yes, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 4, 2002, at 34 (noting
impact of Enron's meltdown on debate about attorney-client confidentiality);
Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility, 58 Bus. LAW. 189, 207 (2002) (noting general "demand that lawyers
play a greater role in promoting corporate responsibility").
170 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965)
(superseded) (describing Service as "itself an adversary party rather than a judicial
tribunal" and suggesting that it "is not designed and does not purport to be
unprejudiced... in the judicial sense"), reprinted in WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 19,
at 55, 56. See generally Franklin L. Green, Exercising Judgment in the Wonderland
Gymnasium, 90 TAx NOTEs 1691 (Mar. 19, 2001) (providing history of Formal
Opinions 314 and 85-352); Watson, supra note 77, at 1199-1202 (discussing in depth).
171 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982),
reprinted in WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 229.
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112
Service as adversarial . The standard developed there (later
incorporated by the Treasury in Circular 230 and by Congress in the
return preparer penalty provision) required that lawyers advising on
undisclosed positions must conclude that there is a reasonable
possibility of success if the position is litigated. The opinion explains
that advice on undisclosed positions is permitted even when the
lawyer does not find that the position is supported by substantial
authority and believes that the position probably will not prevail, so
long as it is one that the lawyer believes "is warranted in existing law
or can be supported by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law." '173 Advice on disclosed
positions satisfies ethical requirements so long as it is not frivolous.
17 4
Thus, the opinion appears to bring into all aspects of tax planning the
adversarial, edge-seeking approach of a litigating attorney acting on
behalf of a client. It supports wholesale incorporation of the "zealous
advocate" perspective in the tax return and audit context without
viewing the self-assessment function as establishing any special
context governing the attorney-client relationship. Because of the
discrepancy between preparer and taxpayer standards,'75 there will
112 See Kenneth L. Harris, Resolving Questionable Positions on a Client's Federal
Tax Return: An Analysis of the Revised Section 6694(a) Standard, 47 TAx NoTEs 971
(May 21, 1990) (discussing Op. 85-352's failure to link advisor's duty to taxpayer's
obligations); Watson, supra note 77, at 1202-03 (discussing advent of realistic
possibility standard and ABA's view that filing a return could be first step in
adversarial process).
173 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985)
[hereinafter Op. 85-352], reprinted in WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 60. This
standard replaced that of Formal Op. 314, which permitted attorneys to "freely urge"
favorable positions that had a reasonable basis, considered to be a ten to twenty
percent chance of success. The standards in Formal Op. 85-352 were then adopted by
Congress in 1989 as the tax return preparer standard under I.R.C. § 6694(a).
174 See Op. 85-352, supra note 173, at 62.
175 Watson articulates the problematic tension between preparer and taxpayer
standards.
[A] tax practitioner who advises her client to disclose a position that is not
frivolous, but is questionable as to whether it has a reasonable basis (i.e.,
the position is merely arguable or colorable), will be insulating herself from
liability, but will be exposing her client to the risk of an accuracy-related
penalty. If the position does not have a reasonable basis, the disclosure will
highlight the position while insulating the preparer, but will place the client
at risk of incurring the penalty.
On the other hand, if the return position has a reasonable basis... and it is
not contrary to a rule or regulation, nor will it result in a substantial
understatement of tax, the taxpayer is justified legally in taking the position
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also be constant pressure from clients for advisors to modify their
• ... 176
view that disclosure is required for an aggressive position.
These standards encourage the tax minimization norm. The
emphasis on loyalty and confidentiality suggests that "loophole-
seeking is not merely permitted but is demanded" with the line drawn
only at outright prevarication or deception about the nature of the tax
claim.
177
b. Duty as Officer of the Court
The failure of the bar to dampen the emphasis on loyalty to
clients in the tax planning and tax return context is not redeemed by
corollary statements about an attorney's duty as an officer of the court
178to uphold the law and duty of candor toward the tribunal. Although
179extolled in the past as a mark of professionalism among attorneys,
this duty may be interpreted to impose at most a vaguely defined
limitation on the practitioner's obligation to the client.' 8°  The
Preamble to the Model Rules states:
A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a
representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a
without disclosure since it will not subject her to an accuracy-related
penalty. But according to the preparer's penalty provision, as well as
Circular 230, the preparer will be subject to sanction and fine if she does
not recommend that the taxpayer disclose the position.
Watson, supra note 77, at 1210-11.
176 Id. at 1212-13. The stricter standard for the affirmative defense in reportable
SPTs may ease this tension somewhat.
177 See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 204, 210-11 (quoting Cooper, supra
note 92, and citing Randolph Paul, The Lawyer as Tax Advisor, 25 ROCKY MTN. L.
REV. 412,420 (1953)).
178 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2003) (duty to uphold law); id.
R. 3.3 (duty of candor).
179 See, e.g., Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1,
2 (1934) (describing attorneys ideally as "guardians of the law, cherishing the
legitimate influence of their guild as that of a profession charged with public duties
and responsibilities").
180 See, e.g., Kristy Brewer, Tax Shelter Information and How the Confidentiality
Rule Protects Clients: The Relevance of Recent Changes to ABA Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.6, 13 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 31 (2004) (analyzing conflict
between duty to protect client confidentiality and implicit duty to protect tax system);
Lee A. Sheppard, What Should We Do About Corporate Tax Shelters?, TAX NOTES
TODAY (Dec. 14, 1998) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 98 TNT 239-79)
(noting view of some "that tax advisors are mere advocates for their clients' return
positions").
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public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice.
... As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's
position under the rules of the adversary system."'
The primary text in tax practice standards attributes this duty to the
system to "a general obligation - derived from the practitioner's
status as a professional - to encourage compliance with the law
(including the tax laws)."1 82
This seems to be a grudging acknowledgment of the duty within
the broader context of duty to client. There is an implicit assumption,
deriving from the adversarial foundation of much of the bar's
understanding of ethical norms, that the duty to uphold the law is in
fact served by zealous advocacy of the client.18 Given the assumption
that a tug of war between two equally committed opponents in the
litigation context is the best process for arriving at the truth, a fierce
loyalty to the client's interest is seen as also serving the public's
interest. Balancing that focus on the client with public responsibilities
receives little attention.14
Commentators admit that tax controversies between taxpayers
and the government "put[] the public interest into the equation" but
nonetheless consider it proper for attorneys to exploit literal
interpretations of the Code "to protect for a taxpayer a right secured
to him by a statutory loophole."'1 85 For many, the public interest's part
in the equation is de minimis - a right of the government not to be
deceived as to the nature of the transaction through a taxpayer fraud
or misrepresentation. 86
181 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2003).
182 WOLFMAN ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE (6th ed.
2004), at 4.
183 See, e.g., Richard C. Stark, Let's Reconsider the "Reasonable Basis" Standard,
59 TAX NOTES 1845 (June 28, 1993) (arguing against proposed change in H.R. 2264
from "not frivolous" to "reasonable basis" for both taxpayers and tax return
preparers as improper in that it imposes higher standard than required of litigable
position).
18 Schwarcz, supra note 84, at 13 (suggesting that, although lawyers' officer-of-
the-court function may "appear to imbue attorneys with some measure of public
responsibility," focus on balancing client and public responsibilities has not spread far
beyond securities regulation).
185 Randolph E. Paul, The Responsibilities of the Tax Adviser, 63 HARV. L. REV.
377, 381-82, 385 (1950).
186 Id. at 384 (noting that transactions should be reasonably disclosed in essential
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Yet there is reason to think that limiting taxpayer aggressiveness
through constraints on the behavior of advisors has merit. As one
commentator noted in the context of securities regulation,
constraining private parties can be beneficial for the social welfare,
remedy the tragedy of the commons problem, achieve allocative
fairness, maintain norms, and enhance the efficiency of markets.
181
These same benefits apply in the tax area. Aggressive tax planning
exacts significant governmental costs in lost revenues and
expenditures of audit and enforcement resources. Taxpayers waste
their funds on tax avoidance expenditures. Taxpayers who comply
without excessive planning around tax liabilities bear the brunt, while
aggressive taxpayers retain a larger share of their income for their
personal satisfaction. Excessive tax planning activity likely breeds
noncompliance when those in the compliant group view the results for
those in the noncompliant group.'8 In the end, general tax rates will
have to be higher to recoup the revenues lost to aggressive tax
planning. 89 All of these distortive effects could be ameliorated, at
least in part, if tax advisors tempered their advice with a coherence-
preserving viewpoint based on respect for anti-manipulation values.
The emphasis on the attorney as advocate in a traditional
adversarial role discounts lawyers' public-service roles. This
adversarial focus is not compatible with either the coherence or self-
assessment characteristics of the tax regime. In particular, it fails to
recognize the material differences between counseling advice that is
provided during the pre-return planning stages of a transaction and
the strategic decision making and preparation that are necessary once
a transaction becomes the subject of litigation. During the planning
stage, there are no clear adversaries - all parties work together to
plan the transaction. Even if parties push for a particular advantage,
the negotiations are primarily cooperative or at least focused on
making the transaction happen. 90 Similarly, when a client reports a
facts).
18 See Schwarcz, supra note 84.
1 See Lederman, Interplay, supra note 75, at 1487-88 nn.190-92 and
accompanying text (describing "chump effect").
189 See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE,
FAIR, & PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM, REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM (2005), at 216 and tbl. 9.1,
http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/final-report (reporting different required retail sales
tax rates necessary to raise equivalent revenues, depending on taxpayers' evasion
rates).
190 See, e.g., Richard Lavoie, Making a List and Checking it Twice: Must Tax
Attorneys Divulge Who's Naughty and Nice?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 141, 146-48
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completed transaction on its return, the government is less an
adversary than a repository of the client's self-assessment documents.
Opinion practices generally require more conservative
approaches that can be fairly substantiated through research of the
law and facts. For any public deal, the lawyer's opinion needs to be
fair so that all those who may refer to it in making their decision about
an investment have adequate information, not unlike public
accountants who serve as public gatekeepers for information about
companies' financial health. T9 The Model Code clearly differentiated
these roles by requiring that an advocate should resolve doubts in the
client's favor, while an advisor should provide an independent
professional judgment regarding the likely decision of courts.192 Thus,
Wolfman, Holden, and Schenk conclude that "[c]onduct that would be
acceptable for the advocate may be considered off limits for the
adviser." '193 It is not clear that the ethical standards provide sufficient
impetus to this duty as an officer of the court.
4. Evidentiary Privileges
Closely related to the ethical rules that ascribe paramount
importance to fiduciary duties to clients are the evidentiary attorney-
client confidentiality privilege and work product doctrine. The
attorney-client privilege, with reputed origins in Elizabethan England
as a protection of attorney status, has become a litigation-based
protection of clients' communications to their attorneys (and, in some
broader interpretations, attorneys' communications to clients). 94 The
classic Wigmore definition asserts that
[w]here legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, the communications
relating to that purpose, made in confidence by the client, are
at his instance permanently protected from disclosure by
himself or by the legal adviser, except the protection be
(2004).
191 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 95 cmt.
c (2000) (recognizing that lawyer's duty to third-party opinion recipients is essentially
same as that of accountant certifying financial statement - to provide independent
and fair review).
192 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3 (1986).
193 WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 193.
194 See, e.g., Bruce Kayle, The Tax Adviser's Privilege in Transactional Matters: A




Because application of the privilege inevitably results in
information loss that could be materially relevant to the case outcome,
the privilege requires considerable justification. The rationale
ordinarily offered is that it benefits society as a whole, and compliance
with the law in particular, by creating an environment in which clients
196
will provide the fullest possible information to their attorneys. This
argument assumes that full information permits attorneys to do the
following:
" prepare cases more appropriately (including defending
against expected damaging evidence or asserting defenses
that otherwise would have been overlooked);
" appraise the merits more realistically and better advise the
client on the wisdom of litigation or settlement (and, as a
corollary, assist the court system by helping clients avoid
inefficient litigation); and
" educate the client more adequately about the law's
requirements and possibly dissuade the client from taking
inappropriate or illegal actions.'9'
This rationale for the privilege is highlighted in much-quoted language
from Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court's seminal
pronouncement on privilege: the evidentiary privilege is intended "to
encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the
observance of law and administration of justice."1 98
Privilege will not apply to much tax planning advice, however,
because circumstances typically surrounding tax planning either
negate a key element of privilege or constitute a waiver of the
195 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292
(McNaughton rev. 1961) (phrase numbering removed).
16 See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (stating that
purpose is to encourage communication).
197 See id.; Kate Kraus, Attorney-Client Privilege Under Fire, TAX NOTES TODAY
(Sept. 20, 2004) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2004 TNT 183-27)
(arguing that courts interpret privilege too narrowly in transactional settings); Lavoie,
supra note 190 (noting points similar to those in text).
198 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. For a representative sample of other cases dealing
with privilege in the tax context, see United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d
681 (1st Cir. 1997); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983,
731 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1984).
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privilege that would otherwise exist. These circumstances include the
following:
" tax structuring that is primarily business rather than protected
legal advice;' 99
* tax work that is considered mere "return preparation";2°°
* legal tax advice of a kind for which there is no expectation of
privacy because of applicable disclosure and list-maintenance
S201
requirements; or
" legal tax advice as to which privilege is waived because the
advice is voluntarily disclosed to third parties or placed at
issue to avoid penalties. 2
Assertions of privilege in the tax setting are particularly damaging
to the public interest because they "hinder[] the ability of the [Service]
to obtain... the most instructive documents." 203 Because of the range
199 See, e.g., United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495 (2d Cir. 1995); Colton v.
United States, 306 F.2d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1962); Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795
(9th Cir. 1954). See generally Robin L. Greenhouse et al., The Service's Tax Shelter
Disclosure Initiative: What Has Become of Privilege?, 97 J. TAX'N 212 (2002)
(discussing circumstances to which privilege applies); Lavoie, supra note 197, at 179
(noting that courts generally allow privilege claims only for advice that is
"predominantly legal, as opposed to business, in nature" and providing various
sources for that view); Sheryl Stratton, IRS Battles Promoter Privilege Claims, TAX
NOTES TODAY (June 7, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT
110-3) (discussing distinction between protected legal advice and mere business
advice).
200 See, e.g., United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984) (prior to
enactment of accountant-client statutory privilege, expounding on different roles
accountants play and suggesting that their work on tax returns is substantially
different from legal advice); United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir.
1999) (similar). See generally Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Ira B. Shepard, Privilege and
the Work Product Doctrine in Tax Cases, 58 TAX LAW. 405 (2005) (discussing
privilege cases in tax planning area).
201 See, e.g., In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(disclosure of tax opinion in SEC proxy statement); Lavoie, supra note 190, at 191
(noting lack of reasonable privacy expectation for many transactions, and particularly
abusive shelters, in light of new reportable transaction disclosure and list-maintenance
requirements).
202 Third-party disclosures typical in tax planning transactions include disclosures
in the course of structuring transactions with multiple participants, disclosure to the
SEC, or, as in the Castle Harbour and Merrill Lynch transactions, to banks or other
accommodation parties to establish the risks connected with loans. See, e.g., Kayle,
supra note 194, at 524-25.
203 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., WRITTEN TESTIMONY ON
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of situations in which privilege questions can arise, from audit through
settlement and litigation, and the current government focus on
abusive transactions, the Service is litigating privilege issues with
increasing frequency. 2°4 In various settlement initiatives in connection
with shelter enforcement, the Service has sought full disclosure of
documentation, including legal memoranda providing legal analysis.
III. POLICY SOLUTIONS
My thesis is that professionalism as it is currently practiced cannot
adequately counter the pressures that encourage tax advisors'
aggressive interpretations. Tax returns are treated confidentially, and
tax opinions written in support of structured transactions are generally
privileged and accessible only to the client and her attorney. Even the
work product doctrine may reach back to protect pre-adversarial tax
planning advice, due to the statutory requirement that tax advice
assess possibility of success on the merits, which implies an ultimate
judicial review. Because of the Service's limited enforcement
resources, the audit lottery remains a manageable risk for many
sophisticated taxpayers. As a result, numerous transactions that the
government would consider abusive likely remain obscured within a
complex layer of business transactions and are never exposed to
litigation. Even if litigated, privilege may protect crucial information
about participants' business purposes from the Service. Something
further is necessary to discourage literalist interpretations as tax-
avoidance mechanisms and the no-holds-barred tax minimization
norm.
Although the changes put in place in the 2004 Jobs Act and
Circular 230 amendments make promotion and marketing of cloned
shelters a riskier business, °6 the effectiveness of the new provisions in
THE REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES
REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (2003).
204 See, e.g., infra note 272.
205 See, e.g., I.R.S. Ann. 2002-2, 2002-1 C.B. 304 (announcing penalty amnesty for
disclosure of tax shelters, including legal opinions and memoranda).
206 For cloned shelters of the type marketed in the 1990s, taxpayers and advisors
must consider the risks of failing to report under the new disclosure requirements,
I.R.C. §§ 6011 (taxpayer), 6111 (advisor), because they cannot be sure that other
participants or taxpayers using the same structure will not report. The strict liability
penalties for failure to report, I.R.C. §§ 6707A (taxpayer), 6707 (advisor), also
increase the likelihood of appropriate reporting. The stiffened requirements for
defending a position taken in connection with a reportable transaction with a
[Vol. 25:583
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modifying the tax bar practice norms in customized transactions is less
demonstrable. Because an advisor in a customized transaction is hired
to plan the structure for tax avoidance and not for penalty protection,
the affirmative defense provided in section 6664(d) may not come into
play. If the taxpayer does not offer the tax opinion as evidence of its
good faith, the defense's stiffer requirements disqualifying certain
advisors and opinions will not be material to the taxpayer's reporting
of the transaction. The advisor is expected to use the Code for the
taxpayer's benefit, creating intricate structures that satisfy literal fit
requirements.
Similarly, although the complex set of Circular 230 rules
governing opinions may frustrate the customized transaction advisor,
they may have little effect on the type of transactions the advisor is
willing to advise or the taxpayer willing to undertake. For many
customized transactions, a detailed opinion that examines each
potential tax issue will satisfy the covered opinion requirements and
would have been provided without the rule changes. For many
transactions that would otherwise require covered opinions, advisors
may provide limited scope opinions without advising (or advising at a
lower confidence level) on issues not within the scope. The advisor
may simply provide a disclaimer opinion. Some may decide to
provide preliminary opinions under the Circular 230 exception
without providing a final covered opinion or an SPT opinion at lower-
confidence levels without complying with the covered opinion
restrictions. If the transaction is not a reportable SPT, the ordinary
penalty and defense provisions will apply. The net result may be no
change in underlying norms.
significant avoidance purpose against a substantial understatement penalty, I.R.C.
§ 6664(d), should make some taxpayers hesitate to undertake otherwise costly
transactions and more likely to disclose as required if they do undertake them. Even
if participants agree orally to play the audit lottery, the threat of sanctions may
ultimately lead them to comply.
Similarly, the Circular 230 modifications make selling opinions for cloned
shelters less useful. Many transactions will require covered opinions. Taxpayers will
discount a marketing opinion that bears disclaimers, and advisors will risk sanctions if
they produce a marketed opinion without disclaimers that does not satisfy the
covered opinion requirements. The 2004 Jobs Act requirement for independent
advisors for penalty protection opinions makes listed and reportable transactions
more costly and reduces the potential for strategies to serve as "profit engines" for
the designer.
207 See Holbrook, supra note 152, at 29 (suggesting disclaimer will be "most
widely used" way to avoid stiffer requirements).
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There are two steps that should be taken that may dramatically
affect norms and at the same time significantly simplify the Code in
the penalty area. First, the penalty standard for taxpayers and return
preparers should be strengthened across the board to acknowledge
208the self-assessment principle and to reinforce structural coherence.
Second, Congress should act to remove privilege issues from
contention in respect of any documents or other materials, including
legal memoranda or opinions, created in connection with the planning
and implementation of transactions prior to the reporting of the
transactions on a taxpayer's return.
A. Institute a More Likely Than Not Standard
Strengthening the standard for taking positions on a return is
particularly appropriate in the context of the recent revisions to the
statutory penalty provisions and Circular 230. Those amendments
reflect a growing concern in Congress and at Treasury about tax-
motivated transactions that disregard the underlying purpose of
statutory and regulatory provisions. There is a tension between
strengthening standards and stiffening penalties for reportable
transactions and retaining a lower standard in other contexts, even for
SPTs. When combined with the possibility of winning the audit
lottery, the reasonable possibility standard may encourage
practitioners and taxpayers to incorrectly treat an aggressive
transaction that should be subject to the higher "shelter" standard as
an ordinary transaction. It would be reasonable to establish a
standard for taxpayers and advisors that requires them to report and
advise, respectively, only positions that they believe in good faith
more likely than not to reflect proper application of the tax laws based
on substantial authority, whether in the context of a super-aggressive
tax transaction or one which is borderline or even ordinary.20'
208 See, e.g., Caplin, supra note 89 (suggesting need to reconsider requiring
MLTN confidence level); Loren D. Prescott, Jr., Challenging the Adversarial
Approach to Taxpayer Representation, 30 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 693, 746-51 (1997)
(suggesting enhanced disclosure requirements with MLTN standard for undisclosed
positions); Lee A. Sheppard, What Are Penalties For?, 85 TAX NOTES 709 (Nov. 8,
1999) (supporting higher standard); supra note 106 (noting Senate proposal, rejected
in conference, to increase standard to more likely than not).
209 This position would require taxpayers to file returns resolving doubts in the
interest of the government and permit them to file for refunds to test positions that
they believe have a reasonable basis in the law. Most ordinary taxpayers likely
already file returns with the "right answer," and only sophisticated taxpayers with
adequate resources pursue aggressive reporting positions (other than outright tax
[Vol. 25:583
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1. Rationale for Heightened Standard
The first and most important supporting rationale is the effect the
higher standard should have on tax compliance norms. If tax lawyers'
duty to uphold the law is comparable to their duty towards their
clients, then they should be permitted to advise a position at the pre-
return stage only if they believe the position is correct and will prevail
if litigated. 1° This approach forces practitioners to adopt coherence-
reinforcing interpretations rather than literalist interpretations that
break the connection between language and underlying purpose."'
Tax practitioners' own statements support this argument that raising
standards changes norms: they complain that the 2004 Jobs Act
penalty provisions and Circular 230 opinion requirements require a
radical shift in perspective, especially if significant purpose
transactions are interpreted to encompass a broad range of tax
212planning advice.
The current standard still results in a mixed message, even for
significant purpose transactions. Although taxpayer penalty
protection for many SPTs and other "shelter" transactions is only
available under more exacting conditions, 2 3 advisors' ability to
provide oral advice generally, and written opinions at a level lower
than MLTN (even though they cannot be relied upon for penalty
protection in respect of many significant-purpose transactions), invites
exploitation of loopholes. So long as advisors can advise taxpayers to
take return positions that they do not expect to prevail on the merits,
taxpayers will continue to adopt aggressive positions that might
succeed depending on the luck of the draw in the audit lottery and
forum selection process.
cheats and frauds, who raise different issues). To require taxpayers to test aggressive
theories in suits for refunds seems appropriate and in accord with distributive justice
principles.
210 See Jay A. Soled, Third-Party Civil Tax Penalties and Professional Standards,
2004 Wis. L. REV. 1611, 1627-28 (discussing ABA's earlier rejection of Treasury's
proposal for more likely than not standard based on importance of attorney role as
client advocate); Watson, supra note 77, at 1213-15 (considering what applicable
standards should be if based on ethical duty to uphold law that has normative force).
211 Cf Soled, supra note 210, at 1640, 1649 (in support of MLTN standard, noting
that virtually all tax positions can satisfy weak "realistic possibility of success"
standard, with result that Code complexities and inconsistencies "open the doors to
transactions.., which Congress never intended to sanction").
2 See, e.g., Beller, supra note 105, at 489 (noting "sea change"); Stratton, supra
note 152 (noting "irrational" label).
213 See supra Part II.C.1.
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In contrast, adoption of a MLTN standard supported by
substantial authority that is applicable to taxpayers and advisors in
respect of all tax positions reported on a return would mandate a new
approach to tax planning that appropriately encourages taxpayers and
advisors to find the most likely correct answer.214 Aggressive loophole
exploitation relying solely on literalist interpretations should be
curtailed, as those applications would lack authority other than the
bare language of the purportedly applicable Code provisions.
Another benefit of a MLTN standard (and expanded applicability
of the stiffer disqualified advisor and disqualified opinion rules of
section 6664(d)) is that it would apply a uniform standard for averting
substantial understatement penalties in respect of all tax positions, for
both taxpayers and advisors."' A uniform standard would remove the
potential conflict of interest that exists currently because the advisor
216
and taxpayer standards differ. It would also resolve any ambiguity
about the scope of the new 2004 Jobs Act tax shelter standard and the
interrelationship between the Code's penalty standards and Circular
217230 opinion requirements. Without such a uniform standard, it can
be expected that at least some practitioners will interpret the shelter
requirements to apply narrowly and assume the lower standards apply
to their clients' transactions, continuing to rely in part on the audit
lottery as a shield. The line between "just enough" support for
litigation and a frivolous suit is very thin, but a practitioner who does
not sign a return is permitted to advise nonfrivolous positions upon
advising the client of the need to disclose to avoid potential
218penalties. With clients pressing for assistance in lowering their tax
liabilities, decisions as to which side of the thin line a position falls
within may be influenced, in spite of best intentions, by client
advantage, as in the case of the REMIC development of the credit
enhancement contract argument for a more taxpayer-favorable
214 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 26 (arguing for a taxpayer duty to file a correct
return).
215 A negligence penalty should likely be retained but with reinterpretation of
reasonableness requirements appropriate to the new standard for nonnegligent
reporting penalties. Consideration of the interrelationship of the new negligence
penalty and the MLTN standard is beyond the scope of this paper.
216 See Watson, supra note 77 (discussing problems resulting from inconsistent
standards).
217 See supra notes 150, 144 (discussing complexity and anomalies in treatment of
SPTs).
218 I.R.C. § 6694(a)(3); see Beale, SEC Heat, supra note 6, at 244-45 (discussing
standards and probabilities typically attached).
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analysis.
Furthermore, a uniform standard removes considerable
complexity from the Code. Instead of the current tangle of standards,
it would provide a single, comprehensible standard for substantial
understatements for taxpayer and return preparer alike that would
apply to all transactions. This is particularly important given the
219
recent focus on simplification as a tax reform goal.
2. Objections to Heightened Standard
Some commentators will undoubtedly object that imposing a
MLTN confidence requirement on all taxpayers and practitioners will
cause more harm than good, perhaps making the kinds of arguments
typically raised against increasing transparency and augmenting
220
sanctions. A heightened standard should not discourage
appropriate consultation about reporting novel business transactions,
because the goal would be to get the right answer, rather than just an
answer that is not so wrong as to be laughable. The pressures that
exist in the current system to find a more accommodating advisor,
however, would not apply.
221
Stiffer reporting requirements should not discourage taxpayers
222from engaging in legitimate business transactions. The MLTN
standard does not make tax planning illegitimate: it merely requires
that reporting for tax purposes conform to the most likely correct view
of a transaction. If a taxpayer plans to engage in a novel transaction
that arises in the ordinary course of business planning and presents an
219 See, e.g., 1 I.R.S. TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., NATIONAL TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE: 2004 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 2-3 (proclaiming complexity to be the
single most important issue for taxpayers); THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON
FED. TAX REFORM, AMERICA NEEDS A BETTER TAX SYSTEM (2005), http://
www.taxreformpanel.gov/04132005.pdf (focusing on simplification).
220 Practitioners, for example, might claim that detailed disclosure and
heightened standards will scare taxpayers away from lawyers when they most need
them, cause taxpayers to forego legitimate business planning transactions out of fear
of compromising their tax returns and create so much uncertainty regarding the
proper interpretation of the Code that practitioners and taxpayers alike will simply
disregard the new requirement, resulting in higher levels of noncompliance than
before the changes.
21 See Watson, supra note 77 (discussing pressure on advisors because of
inconsistent advisor and taxpayer standards).
22 But see Belier, supra note 105, at 491 (without much support, suggesting that,
while 2004 Jobs Act provisions may discourage marketed tax products that are
extraneous to taxpayers' businesses, it "could have the effect as well of dampening the
desire to engage in legitimate creative tax planning").
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apparent opportunity for substantial tax savings, the taxpayer may
decide to request a ruling from the Service to resolve the uncertainties
about the ultimate benefits of the transaction. The likely increase in
ruling requests in these circumstances may mean increased
government resources would be needed to accommodate those
requests, but generally should mean that taxpayers can proceed to go
223about their business without undue complications from the change.
In fact, additional rulings might not be necessary if an expedited
refund claim procedure were also enacted. Taxpayers would report
their tax liability based on the MLTN standard and pay that tax with
the return. With the return, they could also file a refund claim and
request immediate denial of the claim to expedite judicial review. A
taxpayer in a refund suit would continue to be able to contest a tax
liability so long as the claim was not frivolous.
On the other hand, a taxpayer's decision not to engage in a
transaction after an initial assessment of the MLTN tax consequences
would be allocatively efficient if there were not sufficient support to
report the transaction in the way that provided the desired tax benefit
and the transaction costs were too high to merit entering the
transaction without those benefits.
Any law change may result in some deciding to continue current
behavior and risk sanctions. The audit lottery worsens this problem
for tax, suggesting that some positions that do not satisfy the
heightened standard would continue to be advised and taken on
returns without discovery. Just as enforcement tends to increase
224compliance, the heightened standard may support a different view
of the relationship between taxpayers and the government that
reinforces the self-assessment norm rather than undermining it. It
may well be that taxpayers would respond positively to that
reinforcement and increase their efforts to report positions accurately.
Another likely objection to raising standards is that tax advice,
even in the pre-return stage, is sufficiently adversarial in nature to
require the current litigation-based standards. The definition often
23 If the heightened standard and removal of privilege is indeed successful in
fostering significantly better compliance, the Service should not view increased ruling
requests as a problem. Resources that would otherwise be devoted to policing
compliance under the lower standard could be freed to aid the ruling process.
224 See, e.g., Lederman, Interplay, supra note 75 (noting that enforcement tends to
increase compliance).
22 "The 'not frivolous' and 'reasonable basis' standards are grounded in a view
of the tax system as an adversarial one." Sheppard, supra note 208, at 710 (quoting
U.S. Dep't of Treas., Office of Tax Pol'y, Treasury Releases Penalty and Interest
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given for tax opinions implies advocacy:
A legal opinion is typically a lawyer's expression of her
professional judgment as to how the legal issues considered
by her would be resolved if presented for decision to the
226
appropriate legal forum.
There are many difficulties with assuming that tax advice is
adversarial. That assumption cuts directly counter to the self-
assessment compliance norm, in that it assumes that the taxpayer has
no common ground with the government but seeks purchase in a
battle for a lower tax liability. It disregards the anti-manipulation
value by pitting taxpayer against government in a battle of wits.
227
In sum, the potential objections to a higher standard for tax
reporting fall short of a persuasive argument for retaining the status
quo. A uniform standard would remove existing conflicts between
attorneys and clients and simplify the Code compliance requirements.
Raising the standard should directly affect the social norms governing
tax planning and encourage coherence-preserving interpretations over
literalist applications of Code provisions to new contexts inconsistent
with statutory purpose. Although concerns about the attorney-client
relationship are not trivial, it does not seem that raising the standards
would adversely affect that relationship. In fact, the need for greater
certainty should lead clients considering aggressive transactions to
seek more thorough vetting of potential tax risks. Raising the
standard should not impact legitimate business transactions, but
should encourage more prudent, less aggressive advice in respect of
the reporting of those transactions. At worst, taxpayers and advisors
will more frequently request rulings from the Service on tax
consequences of novel transactions, though even that process may be
rendered unnecessary with appropriate expedited refund claim
mechanisms for initiating review under litigation standards. The
higher reporting standard should help change the tax minimization
norm towards a more balanced one that takes the integrity of the law
into account. Taxpayers should curtail some of their most aggressive
tax planning activity - whether in the form of marketed shelter
Study, TAX NoTEs TODAY (Oct. 26, 1999) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit.,
1999 TNT 206-34)).
226 WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 221 (emphasis added).
227 As Sheppard bluntly states, "it is hard to see how any advisers can maintain
responsibility to the system when they are allowed to take litigating positions on
returns." Sheppard, supra note 208, at 710.
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participation or customized tax planning - because of the need for
greater certainty about tax results and the correspondingly higher
transaction costs of satisfying that goal.
B. Eliminate Evidentiary Privileges for Pre-Return Tax Advice
The different standards for tax positions and the unique pressures
on advisors to satisfy their clients' goals for tax minimization argue for
a new paradigm governing the relationship between tax advisors and
clients. In light of the increased emphasis on attorney regulation
under the 2004 Jobs Act and Circular 230 amendments (and in
particular the attention there to the difference between pre-return and
post-return advice), the time has come to modify the application of
attorney-client privilege and work product protection for documents
or other materials created in connection with pre-return tax planning.
A focus on the public interest would support a broad repeal of
privilege for all tax planning other than in the context of criminal tax
fraud litigation (e.g., whether at the return filing stage, the audit stage,
or even when a notice of deficiency may be said to initiate an actual
controversy).. A narrower limitation - one that eliminates
attorney-client privilege for any materials related to pre-return tax
planning but not necessarily for all pre-return advice - might also be
considered, but would leave opportunities for manipulation by
delaying advice to a post-transactional planning, pre-return period in
order to ensure privileges could still apply. I believe that a tax-specific
rule that limits privilege to only those communications and related
materials prepared as post-return advice, combined with the MLTN
229
standard, would be the best approach 2. It would strike an
228 See Kayle, supra note 194, at 551-52 (suggesting this approach to privilege in
tax context).
229 Other commentators have suggested a similar limitation on privilege. See,
e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Confidentiality and Customer Relations, 99 TAx NOTES 1303,
1304-06 (June 2, 2003) (arguing that all tax planning advice is nonprivileged return
preparation work). Sheppard argues that there is no valid basis for distinguishing
between return preparation work and planning and that the public interest is better
served if they are both free of privilege claims, but she recommends a narrower
privilege-free zone than the one proposed by Kayle, in that the return filing would
mark the beginning of possible privilege application. Note that limiting privilege to
the post-return setting results in a significantly smaller amount of material eligible to
enjoy the attorney-client privilege protection during adversarial processes. A
taxpayer would not be permitted to claim the attorney-client privilege during audits
or litigation in respect of materials and information related to pre-return
conversations, planning or advice. Similarly, work product protection would not
cover any materials prepared during that pre-return period. See infra Part III.B.7.
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appropriate compromise with the conflicting views that practitioners
and taxpayers may have regarding the audit stage of tax disputes, in
line with the Circular 230 focus on pre-return advice and the 2004
Jobs Act "disqualified advisor" affirmative defense focus on the
230planning stages of transactions.
The following sections advance the arguments for eliminating
privilege and work product protection from pre-return tax planning.
Section 1 discusses characteristics peculiar to the tax system that argue
for a different interpretation of privilege than that accorded to client
communications in other legal regimes. Section 2 notes the lack of a
nonarbitrary distinction between work that has traditionally been
considered nonprivileged "tax return preparation work" and other
kinds of pre-return tax planning. All such work is directed towards
determining the way items will be reported on tax returns. Section 3
reviews the reasons why privilege may be inapplicable to tax planning
under current law. Section 4 notes that the 2004 Jobs Act changes and
recent privilege litigation provide further reasons for repeal. Section 5
explains why the adversarial foundation of the privilege is harmful in
the tax context, and Section 6 demonstrates that supposed harms to
clients from eliminating the privilege are overstated. Finally, Section
7 makes the argument against work product protection for pre-return
advice.
1. Relevance of the Self-Assessment Principle
Some commentators have asserted that the attorney-client
privilege either is not or should not be generally applicable in the tax
211planning context. Others suggest that privilege should in practice
rarely be found applicable because of the nature of tax advice and
230 I.R.C. § 6664(d).
231
Disclosure is the purpose of a tax return. A tax return is an attested
document. It is signed by the taxpayer and the preparer under penalties of
perjury. It is not an opening offer. It is not a submission in an adversarial
proceeding. It is not a criminal representation calling for a zealous
advocate of the client's innocence. It is not a vehicle for playing the audit
lottery; it is filed with the expectation that it will be examined.
Sheppard, supra note 229, at 1304 (concluding that tax return advice, interpreted
broadly to include tax planning preparatory thereto, is not privileged under current
law either because it is not legal advice or because of the disclosure purpose). But see
Lavoie, supra note 197, at 190-91 (rejecting Sheppard's claim as "not overly
persuasive under current law").
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modern transactional practice, which together practically ensure that
privilege assertions will fail one or another of the basic
requirements. These arguments for denying (or strongly limiting)
privilege for any pre-return tax advice rest on several factors that are
peculiar to the tax context.
First, unlike other legal regimes, tax is a set of rules that
characterize the results of taxpayer transactions for purposes of
determining appropriate assessment. It is not a set of prohibitory
rules that are intended to ensure that a person's transactions stay on
234the legal side of a fixed line between legal and illegal conduct.
Other legal regimes set out strict requirements that regulated entities
must follow to avoid sanction for committing a proscribed act (such as
insider trading under the securities laws) or for failing appropriately
to implement a required act (such as maintenance of reserve funds for
232 See, e.g., Kayle, supra note 194, at 514-16, 551-52 (suggesting that privilege
claims related to tax planning in modem transactional practice will often fail one or
more critical elements and proposing that no privilege should be permitted in any tax
controversy other than criminal litigation). But see Michael W. Loudenslager, Cover
Me: The Effects of Attorney-Accountant Multidisciplinary Practice on the Protections
of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 33 (2001) (arguing that privilege
is necessary because clients will be less likely to consult attorneys for transactional
work if they know that damaging information may be obtained from them).
233 Narrowing of privilege in the tax context would not necessarily result in
similar narrowing in other areas where legal representation has a public interest
component, such as securities regulation. First, the proposal advanced here is a tax-
specific proposal applicable to the narrow pre-retum planning context and not to
other contexts where taxpayers may seek tax counsel. Since it can be sufficiently
cabined within the tax system, there is no reason that it must affect privilege in other
areas of regulation where there are third-party beneficiaries of a more transparent
system. Second, while in any context evidentiary privileges protect a private litigant
at some cost to the public good relative to a full airing of information, the tax system
has a number of unique characteristics that separate it from other regulatory regimes,
as discussed further in the accompanying text. For example, securities regulation is
viewed as important to permit the markets to function more transparently and aid
small investors in participating alongside sophisticated insiders. Transparency
requirements are imposed through reporting that is itself available to the public.
Transparency requirements are modified in private offerings from which small
investors are excluded, because sophisticated investors are presumed not to need the
extra protections. The tax system, in contrast, functions to collect revenues to run the
government, a quintessentially public function where the benefit of the system is
dispersed over all citizens and residents. Because tax requires self-assessment, aided
by withholding and information reporting for many ordinary taxpayers, the tax
minimization planning of the most sophisticated taxpayers may threaten the system.
Yet the Code generally protects all tax returns from public scrutiny.
234 See, e.g., Kayle, supra note 194, at 551; Lavoie, supra note 197.
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banking institutions or appropriate sanitation in hospital operating
rooms). For these regimes, violators are subject to punishment,
235
whether or not they relied on advice from counsel . In contrast, the
Code neither proscribes nor mandates that taxpayers conduct their
activities by means of particular transactions. A company may decide
to conduct an acquisition under the rules for a statutory merger or
may instead acquire a company in a form governed by the taxable
acquisition rules. The choice as to mode of arranging affairs is the
taxpayer's business, but the decision as to how those arrangements
will be taxed is the government's business. Congress has legislated
rules that are intended to be adequate to the taxpayer's self-
assessment task of determining the tax consequences adhering to
236
actions undertaken for non-Code reasons.
There are only two coercive elements in the Code enforced
through the audit process and penalty sanctions - tax reporting and
237tax payments. A taxpayer (and certain third parties who have
control of funds and can provide information reports to substantiate
taxpayer reporting) must file a return that reports tax-relevant
transactions based upon the taxpayer's determination regarding
application of the substantive Code provisions to the particular
situation. A taxpayer must also actually pay over to the government
an amount equal to the tax liability thus determined. Even here, the
Code is much more forgiving than other regimes such as antitrust, in
that it generally foregoes penalizing mistakes made in reliance on
advice from tax counsel.
This regime of rules that characterize and assess rather than label
and punish argues for a different view of privilege. In other legal
regimes, a person at the moment of undertaking an activity is either
within or without the law - eligible for treatment as an upstanding
citizen or subject to civil or criminal sanctions. The purpose of the
evidentiary privilege to foster attorney-client consultations is clearly
implicated. An attorney engaged before the activity takes place may
well be able to dissuade a client from engaging in the activity, thus
furthering compliance with the law. An attorney engaged after the
activity takes place will be the client's advocate in a per se adversarial
235 Persons who violate U.S. antitrust laws face treble damage claims, and it is
irrelevant whether they relied on advice of antitrust counsel. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2005)
(providing strict liability penalty for persons injured by violations of antitrust laws).
236 "Overly aggressive reporting of a transaction may be illegal, but engaging in





controversy. The fact that a client relies on supportive advice in
undertaking the activity does not excuse wrong actions.
In the tax system, however, the result is the opposite. An
attorney engaged before the activity takes place generally has no need
to dissuade a client from undertaking a transaction in any particular
fashion - the only obligation is to report the resulting tax liability
fairly. Similarly, engagement of an attorney to assist in transaction
planning does not signal the initiation of an adversarial process. It
may be that the client and the Service will agree in all respects as to
the tax treatment of the planned transaction, and the planning process
may even take advantage of the ruling request process to ensure that
no adversarial relationship ensues. In practical terms, the process
during the tax return, audit and even proposed adjustment phase is
cooperative rather than adversarial. A clearly adversarial relationship
arises only at the point that a dispute cannot be resolved through the
cooperative give and take of the audit process and a notice of
deficiency is issued forcing the taxpayer to choose between
compliance with the government's characterization of the transaction
or litigation. Even if the taxpayer ultimately is found to have
underpaid taxes, reliance on tax counsel may well avoid any penalty
assessments.
Second, the tax system established by the Code relies on
individual taxpayers to self-assess, file a return disclosing the relevant
facts necessary to determine the taxpayer's tax liability, and pay over
the tax due. The government does not send out tax police to
inventory each taxpayer, log activities and calculate a tax fine as
238
appropriate. Because a return requires disclosure of all relevant tax
facts, any records, documents, and other information or analyses used
to arrive at the particular information included are directly relevant
and material. They are impliedly available for review to ascertain
whether the taxpayer has followed the rules appropriately. 39 The self-
238 There are, however, some state experiments in which the government
provides completed returns for some taxpayers (primarily those whose wages are
reported by employers). See Joseph Bankman, Simplifying the Tax System for
Average Citizens: The California "ReadyReturn," http://www.law.stanford.edu/faculty/
bankman/Forthcoming-articleTaxNotes.doc (discussing a pilot state project).
239 See, e.g., United States v. Merrell, 303 F. Supp. 490, 492-93 (N.D.N.Y. 1969)
(suggesting that reasons supporting availability of accountants' tax accrual work
support availability of any records the information on which is used in connection
with return preparation; since return discloses information derived from underlying
documents, it is appropriate to assume that underlying information was prepared to
be disclosed).
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assessment system and corollary anti-manipulation value underlying
the tax regime elevate the importance of the return disclosure
requirement compared to other legal systems, since self-assessment
cannot function successfully if taxpayers do not provide accurate
information on their returns. Both the Service and the democratic
polity require fair and inclusive reporting to function appropriately.
The Service does not have sufficient resources to examine every
return, and the public at large bears the burden in higher taxes or
lesser services when taxpayers successfully play the audit lottery to
avoid their fair shares of the tax burden. As Treasury, the Service,
and the Department of Justice argued when Congress debated
extending the attorney-client privilege to accountants in some
contexts, the public good is harmed by an evidentiary shield that
inhibits investigation, impedes the search for truth, and encourages
taxpayers to risk litigation rather than resolve disputes.
The public policies underlying the increased disclosure
requirements under the 2004 Jobs Act and this self-assessment system
accordingly argue for a different approach to privilege than that
applicable in other legal regimes. A taxpayer who can conduct
planning for its activities behind closed doors (and control, to some
extent or entirely, the public information related to those activities)
remains in sole possession of the critical information relevant to
assessment of its tax liabilities. The government - in this case not an
adversary but merely the transactional counterpart in the tax
determination process - remains essentially at the mercy of the
taxpayer to provide it sufficient information so that it may, in the few
returns actually audited, come to its own determination as to tax
liability and evaluate the taxpayer's assessment effort. An evidentiary
privilege rooted in the adversarial litigation process that is used to
protect the most basic and most relevant information from the
transactional planning stage directly and substantially hinders
assessment.24'
240 L. Anthony Sutin, Justice Letter Raising Constitutional Concerns in IRS
Reform, TAX NOTES TODAY 16-18 (June 11, 1998) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT
file, elec. cit., 98 TNT 112-41); see also Sheryl Stratton, Accountant-Client Privilege
Proposal Sliced and Diced, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 29, 1998) (LEXIS, FEDTAX
lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 98 TNT 103-1) (noting both Justice and Treasury opposed new
privilege as "unwise and unwarranted"); Alyson Petroni, Note, Unpacking the
Accountant-Client Privilege Under LR. C. Section 7525, 18 VA. TAX REV. 843, 849-50
(1999) (describing enactment).
241 See, e.g., John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 468-70 (1982) (contrasting
"voluntary compliance" model that assumes people comply when informed of law's
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Critics' likely argument that disallowance of privilege in this
context would eviscerate the fundamental goal of encouraging client
communications with lawyers because clients will fear their damaging
information will be made public carries a not-so-subtle irony.242 It
amounts to an argument that the legal rules should work to encourage
taxpayers to use attorneys to plan aggressive tax sheltering
transactions that have no social value by preventing the government
from access to information about the tax liability that a taxpayer has
proclaimed through the self-assessment system. The converse is true:
recent evidence of corporate malfeasance supports sunshine laws, not
closed door operations.
Third, Treasury's strategy of enhancing disclosure to combat
shelters - reinforced now by Circular 230's opinion standards and the
2004 Jobs Act's codification of the disclosure regime with enhanced
penalty requirements - establishes a broad transparency principle
that overlays the self-assessment regime. Companies and taxpayers
should be aware of the various rules requiring them to disclose
information about tax strategies in many situations. They should
recognize a special need to be forthcoming with their attorneys in
discussions about tax consequences for all their transactions, in case
those transactions ultimately are subject to the heightened reporting
requirements. The reporting requirements should therefore generally
encourage more openness between attorneys and clients whether or
243
not the discussions are protected by privilege.
In spite of these strong arguments favoring elimination of
privilege in the tax planning stage, courts continue to take a fairly
broad view of the application of the common law privilege to tax
244
controversies. In fact, actual practice confers a broader scope of
demands, which suggests that privilege encourages compliance, with "regulatory"
model that assumes attorneys strategically stymie enforcement, which suggests that
elimination of privilege is necessary to law enforcement).
242 See Loudenslager, supra note 232 (arguing that privilege supports frank
communications between attorney and client because clients will otherwise not
disclose unfavorable information to attorneys).
243 See, e.g., Sexton, supra note 241, at 463-64 (noting that regulatory state puts
into question underlying premise that privilege is necessary to encourage frank
communication). "[Clorporate clients are candid with their attorneys not because of
the privilege but because they realize that the costs of withholding information are
likely to be far greater than the disadvantages flowing from the risk that the
communication will later be divulged." Id. at 464.
244 See, e.g., United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 2005-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,264 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (finding various tax advice privileged under both attorney-
client and statutory privileges); TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 223 F.R.D. 47 (D.
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privilege to tax planning advice than to other legal advice by applying
the privilege in the administrative phases of tax controversies as well
as the litigation phase.245
2. No Viable Distinction Between Tax Planning and Nonprivileged
Return Preparation Work
Although their arguments differ and the scope of the material
included is not clear, federal circuit courts have generally concluded
that attorneys' tax return preparation work is not privileged. 246 The
main rationale for finding a lack of privilege is the comparison of tax
preparation work by attorneys to similar tax work done by tax
accountants who are not authorized to practice law. An accountant
must be knowledgeable about tax law in order to prepare the self-
assessment return forms, but the forms are viewed by the courts as
"primarily informative in character and not of the nature of strict legal
instruments, which establish, limit, or terminate rights and
liabilities., 247  Another supporting rationale is that an accountant's
accrual work papers are not considered made in confidence because
they are expected to be disclosed in accordance with security
248
regulations and upon the Service's request.
Conn. 2004) (applying privilege to protect law firm opinion letters); Long-Term
Capital Holdings v. United States, 2003-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,304 (D. Conn.
2003) (finding work product protection for tax opinion, and deferring consideration of
privilege until decision on advice-of-counsel defense); Lavoie, supra note 197, at 190-
92 (suggesting broader view of tax return preparation work as encompassing all tax
planning and nullifying privilege is not supported in current law); McMahon &
Shepard, supra note 200, at 407 (noting general application of privilege to tax
planning).
245 See Kayle, supra note 194, at 509.
246 See supra note 200. See generally Bruce Graves, Attorney Client Privilege in
Preparation of Income Tax Returns: What Every Attorney-Preparer Should Know, 42
TAX LAW. 577 (1989) (discussing cases and arguing that only materials actually
disclosed are intended to be disclosed). Some commentators disagree with the trend
towards transparency in this area. See, e.g., Kraus, supra note 197, at 1448 (arguing
that disallowing privilege in pre-litigation tax return preparation context because of
disclosure requirement improperly holds transactional lawyers to different standard).
247 Katherine D. Black & Stephen T. Black, A National Tax Bar: An End to the
Attorney-Accountant Tax Turf War, 36 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 17, 23 (2004) (quoting 1950
ALR entry and noting that this assessment is "ridiculous" because "even the simplest
tax return may... establish legal rights").
248 United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982); see Memorandum
from Deborah M. Nolan, Commissioner, Large and Mid-Size Bus. Div., Internal
Revenue Serv., to Executives, Managers, and Examiners, Large and Mid-Size Bus.
Div., Internal Revenue Serv. (Apr. 14, 2005), http://www.irs.gov/businesses/
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It is relevant that the courts' rationales for denying privilege for
attorney tax preparation work are almost all based on the law prior to
enactment of section 7525's limited accountant-client privilege24 ' and
generally piggy-back on conclusions about accountant tax advice. For
example, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits consider tax preparation work
generally not privileged because it is "primarily an accounting
service." The Eleventh Circuit considers tax preparation work more
similar to nonprivileged accountant work than to legal advice.25' The
Eighth Circuit concluded that an attorney who fills out tax returns is
252
merely acting as a scrivener rather than rendering legal advice. The
Ninth Circuit agrees with this approach to evaluating attorneys' tax
return work.253 The Second Circuit holds similarly that attorney tax
return preparation work is not privileged, but does so based on the
rationale that there is no expectation of confidentiality in the tax
return context where disclosure to the government is mandated by
law.2 4
United States v. Frederick, a recent and much-cited Seventh
Circuit case, is explicit in drawing a distinction between privileged and
non-privileged work based on the activities in which an attorney is
engaged.25  According to Frederick, attorneys who are in actuality
doing little more than the accountant-like behavior of tallying
numbers for a return are not engaged in the provision of privileged
legal advice, but tax planning outside that context is protected by the
article/0,,id=139322,00.html (discussing mandatory nature of workpaper policy in
IRM § 4.10.20); Emily A. Parker, Deputy Chief Counsel (Ops.), Internal Revenue
Serv., Address to the Tex. Fed. Tax Inst. 2 (June 6, 2003), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/parker-60603.pdf (noting right to obtain workpapers because "they are prepared
in connection with the taxpayer's disclosure of its financial condition to third
parties").
249 See supra note 240; infra Part III.B.4.
250 United States v. Bornstein, 977 F.2d 112, 116 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1043 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981).
251 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 1987).
252 Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849, 857 (8th Cir. 1966).
253 United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297,298 (9th Cir.1973).
2M Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1962); cf. Kenneth L.
Harris, On Requiring the Correction of Error Under the Federal Tax Law, 42 TAX
LAW. 515, 530-31 (1989) (suggesting that intended disclosure rationale is weak,
because taxpayers may reveal materials to attorney for legal advice as to whether item
should be reported).
255 182 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that documents and information held
by attorney were those accountants generally produce in preparing clients' returns).
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attorney-client privilege. 6 The case holds that information furnished
to a preparer is furnished "for the purpose of enabling the preparation
of the return, not the preparation of a brief or an opinion letter.,
25
Taken together, these decisions point out the similarities between
accountants' and attorneys' roles in tax planning and tax preparation
and provide various rationales for treating tax planning work as
nonlegal, business planning that should not be protected by the
attorney-client privilege. That tax is a noncoercive legal regime that
cannot be avoided by any business enterprise makes the factual and
legal line between privileged planning and nonprivileged tax return
preparation or business advice conceptually and practically difficult to
draw, however. The current line appears to be an arbitrary
distinction primarily protective of lawyer work on behalf of a client's
211
self interest rather than of the rule of law.
Recent court decisions on identity privilege (e.g., protection of
information regarding a client's identity) and waiver have given even
260more credence to the business nature of tax planning advice. These
cases suggest that judges who analyze the typical language included in
tax opinions - "you have requested our opinion regarding the U.S.
federal income tax consequences of" and concluding that there is a
"greater than 50 percent likelihood that the following positions will be
upheld if challenged" - may rule that such language presupposes that
the opinion advice will be used to determine how to report the
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 See, e.g., B. John Williams, Jr., Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Serv.,
Address to the Tex. Fed. Tax Inst. (June 6, 2002), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/williams-60602.pdf (stating promoted opinions are unlikely to be privileged
because of wide dissemination among unrelated third parties and likelihood of being
based on hypothetical circumstances rather than particularized taxpayer facts); see
also Black & Black, supra note 247, at 52 (noting difficulty in distinguishing legal
advice and business advice in corporate context); Sheppard, supra note 229, at 1305
(noting that "[tihe question is how far back in the tax advice process the concept of
return preparation reaches" and suggesting that the tax return should be viewed
similarly to financial statements as a disclosure document intended for public
purposes).
259 See, e.g., Janice A. Alwin & Jason P. Eckerly, Raising the Tax Bar: Redefining
the Roles of Accountants and Lawyers for a Practical Solution to the Multidisciplinary
Practice Debate, 1 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 257 (2003) (considering corporate
scandals and pressure on SEC to ban auditor provision of tax services as proof of
need to regulate tax services at time when distinction between tax and accounting, or
tax and legal, services is at best difficult to delineate).
260 See McMahon & Shepard, supra note 244, at 422-28 (discussing identity
privilege cases).
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transaction that is the subject of the opinion. 26' There would be no
reason for an advisor to reach a conclusion about the strength of a tax
return position if the client were not interested in the reporting of the
position on a return. The ultimate goal of the tax planning in respect
of any customized tax transaction is to decide how the structure
should be carried out so that it implements the agreed-upon tax
objective of reporting the results from the structure to derive a
particular tax benefit. It would therefore be reasonable for a court to
determine that any information and opinions regarding tax
consequences of a transaction are principally connected with the filing
of the tax return reporting the transaction rather than with litigation
prospects (though undoubtedly concerns about litigation are latent in
any transaction that cannot garner a "will" level opinion).262
3. Privilege Often Inapplicable in Planning Contexts
The majority view appears to be that legal advice regarding the
tax consequences of a transaction, even at the planning stage, is not
"tax return preparation work" and therefore may qualify for
protection under the attorney-client privilege. Even if it does not
qualify for attorney-client privilege protection, courts may find that it
can qualify for protection under the work product doctrine. Assuming
that tax planning can be eligible for privilege protection, however,
does not mean that much of the typical tax planning work actually is
protected. In many planning situations, the privilege will not exist
because one or another of the privilege requirements will not be
satisfied.
For example, confidentiality between attorney and client does not
exist if the attorney and client do not have a legal representation
relationship. In promoted tax-avoidance transactions, an attorney's
opinion that has been provided to a promoter and then by the
promoter to the client would not satisfy the confidentiality standard
261 See, e.g., United States v. KPMG LLP, 237 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42 (D.D.C. 2002).
The cited language led the KPMG court to conclude "that [the opinion letter] was
prepared in conjunction with preparation of a tax return" in part because the Service
cannot become aware of a position "by a means other than a tax return." Id.
(emphasis in original).
262 "[I]nformation received from, and opinions provided to, clients of tax
practitioners regarding the tax consequences of a proposed transaction are highly
unlikely to be considered privileged. Tax advice is likely to be considered tax return
preparation and, therefore, not privileged." Joe Walsh, Recent Court Decision
Virtually Eliminates Tax Practitioner Privilege, 70 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 324, 335
(2003) (commenting on KPMG decision).
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for either the promoter (who has given the opinion to third parties) or
the client (who has not developed a direct relationship with the
attorney). 263  Even in many customized tax transactions, planning
takes place with representatives of many central and peripheral
parties to the arrangements, and tax attorneys' views of the necessary
structure, the problems that may be presented, or the flaws in a
proposed structure are shared with all. In a transaction like Castle
Harbour, there were at least two parties - the GE financing entities
and related parties and the foreign banks - that undoubtedly
discussed in full the tax advisors' views of the partnership allocation
provisions, because they were central to the parties' expectations of
payments from the deal. Those circumstances may result in waiver
because of sharing beyond the attorney-client relationship with parties
264not covered by the "common interest" exception to waiver.
Similarly, the trend towards enhanced disclosure requirements
suggests a much narrower purview for privilege claims. The
reportable transaction rules, essentially codified through passage of
the 2004 Jobs Act, require detailed reports to the Service about
various types of transactions. Claims of privilege are more likely to be
denied on the basis that information required to be disclosed is not
expected to be kept confidential. 265 As privilege claims are litigated,
the critical mass of new disclosure requirements may be viewed as
having eroded the rationale for the privilege in the tax planning
context.
Although many federal courts apply a broader rule, the
traditional scope of the attorney-client privilege is limited to
communications from the client to the attorney.26 Attorney opinions,
263 See, e.g., Doe v. Wachovia, 268 F. Supp. 2d 627, 634 (D.N.C. 2003) (finding no
attorney-client relationship where Jenkens & Gilchrist merely marketed a package
including a memorandum describing potential tax consequences of a marketed
transaction).
264 See TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 223 F.R.D. 47, 50 (D. Conn. 2004)
(describing common interest rule).
265 See Chuck Gnaedinger, IBA Panel Discusses Attorney-Client Privilege,
Sarbanes-Oxley Effects, 2003 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 181-2 (Sept. 18, 2003)
(suggesting disclosure will make privilege claims more difficult).
266 See, e.g., United States v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 986 (3d Cir.
1980) (affirming lack of privilege but rejecting in dicta district court's application of
traditional view that privilege applies only to client communications and not to legal
analysis). The privilege rationale does not support the broader view, which may have
been accepted by federal courts through confused incorporation from diversity cases
where broader state law privileges applied. Roger W. Kirst, A Third Option:
Regulating Discovery of Transaction Work Product Without Distorting the Attorney-
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mental impressions, conclusions or legal theories are not protected
under the privilege, unless revelation would reveal communications
from the client. Accordingly, even client facts learned from a third
party are unprotected. While the work product doctrine may provide
broader protection, 7 the traditional scope of that doctrine limits it to
268situations where litigation is actually threatened or imminent. Thus,
in courts that do not apply the broader derivative privilege rule
protecting any communication between attorneys and clients in the
course of a legal representation or the broader work product rule, tax
planning materials - including legal analysis - would not be
protected from disclosure except to the extent they reveal client
communications.
Finally, voluntary disclosure of confidential information by a
client waives privilege. Use of tax opinions prepared in connection
with structuring of transactions for penalty protection acts as a waiver
of the privilege for all documents related to the subject matter of the
opinion.
4. 2004 Jobs Act Changes and Recent Privilege Litigation Support
Repeal
Two aspects of the 2004 Jobs Act and recent litigation provide
further support for repeal of the privilege in the pre-return context.
The first is narrowing of the application of the relatively new
accountant-client privilege provided under section 7525. The second
is the stiffening of requirements for penalty protection for reportable
transactions with a significant tax avoidance purpose.
Briefly, the accountant-client privilege was enacted in 1998 as an
extension of the attorney-client privilege to accountants and other
advisors who may be admitted to practice before the Service. 269 The
language of the privilege appears on its face to apply to (and possibly
limit other privileges of) all who are considered tax practitioners for
purposes of practice before the Service, including attorneys,
accountants and commercial tax return preparers. The legislative
history, however, states that the section 7525 privilege was not
Client Privilege, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 229, 250-55 (2000).
267 See infra notes 294-304 and accompanying text.
268 A broader work product doctrine that protects materials prepared "because
of" litigation applies in some courts. See infra notes 297-299.
269 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-206, § 3411(a), 112 Stat. 685, 750 (1998); I.R.C. § 7525 (2004).
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intended to abrogate the attorney-client privilege. 70 Accordingly, the
statutory section 7525 privilege may apply to attorneys and
accountants (among others) in the limited settings provided, but the
broader attorney-client privilege applies only to attorneys (and not
other authorized tax practitioners) in any setting - including in the
context of potentially abusive shelter transactions. Prior to the 2004
Jobs Act, the statutory practitioner privilege applied only to
noncriminal proceedings before the Service or in federal court where
the United States was a party, and was not available in the case of a
corporate taxpayer's SPT. The 2004 Jobs Act narrowed the statutory
privilege still further, making it inapplicable to any taxpayer in respect
of an SPT.27 ' That narrowing of the practitioner privilege should be
viewed as reflecting a growing concern in Congress about potential
privilege abuse.
There are, however, real concerns about the effectiveness of this
narrowing of the practitioner privilege. Without concomitant
language narrowing the common law attorney-client privilege, the
change is only half a loaf. The result may merely provide an incentive
to shift more aggressive individual tax planning back to attorneys and
away from accountants. While the language of the provision could be
taken to include the attorney-client privilege, it is highly unlikely that
courts will interpret the language in derogation of the common law
privilege, given the clear statement in the 1998 legislative history.
Furthermore, recent privilege litigation suggests that at least some
courts will give short shrift to the clear text of the shelter exception to
272the statutory privilege. In a recent decision in connection with BDO
Seidman-sponsored shelters, the district court refused to accept the
Service's characterization of the transaction as a "cookie cutter"
270 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1998, at 87 (Joint Comm. Print 1998), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1998-joint-committee
_on taxation&docid=f:52240.pdf ("The provision does not modify the attorney-client
privilege of confidentiality, other than to extend it to other authorized
practitioners."); see, e.g., Lavoie, supra note 197, at 176 & n.163 (arguing that
attorney-client privilege applies, in spite of technical inclusion of attorneys in the
accountant-privilege section, absent clear statement from Congress to contrary).
271 2004 Jobs Act § 813(a), I.R.C. § 7525 (2004).
272 Compare United States v. KPMG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2004)
(strongly worded opinion in Service's favor applying narrow view of privilege in
shelter-reporting context), and United States v. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., 2003-2
U.S.T.C. 50,624 (N.D. 11. 2003) (similar), with United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP,




shelter, based on the large number of identical letters for numerous
clients, for purposes of applying the crime-fraud exception to the
common law attorney-client privilege."3 The common law privilege
applied, because "[tlhe question of whether the [parties] engaged in
unlawful activity, or alternative[ly] properly complied with the tax
code, is one of the ultimate questions for this litigation. '274 Without
any analysis of the significant difference between the crime-fraud
exception and the statutory exception for SPTs, the court also ruled
that the SPT exception could not be said as a matter of law to limit the
• . 275
statutory practitioner privilege. This approach to the privilege
eviscerates the statutory "significant tax avoidance purpose"
language: it is hard to see how any transaction that yields significant
tax benefits would not per se satisfy the broad language. If privilege
determinations cannot be made by reaching a preliminary conclusion
about tax avoidance purpose, the exception is in danger of being
written out of the Code. 76 Documents protected by privilege will
likely be necessary to demonstrate that the purported tax benefits
from the transaction are not available. Repeal of the common law
privilege altogether in the pre-return context would better comport
with tax needs.
The second significant 2004 Jobs Act change is the more stringent
requirement for penalty protection in respect of listed and other
reportable transactions that have a significant tax avoidance purpose,
including the distinction between independent advisors and those who
• • 277
participate in transaction planning. The disqualified tax advisor rule
provides that an advisor who structures such transactions cannot
provide an opinion that establishes a reasonable cause/good faith
273 BDO Seidman, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5555 at *30, *26-31.
274 See id. at *30 ("The fact that the IRS characterizes a business or individual's
transactions as abusive and unlawful cookie cutter tax shelters does not mean that this
characterization is a proper conclusion as a matter of law.").
275 Id. at *31 n.6.
276 See, e.g., United States v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6452, at *17-18 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2004) (determining whether the firm sold
shelters would be "a complicated question"; but client identities were not privileged
because they were not communications, whether or not transactions were shelters);
Robert E. McKenzie & Vernon Hoven, The Tax Advisor Privilege: How the
Confidentiality Privilege Applies to Practitioners 9 (1999) (on file with Va. Tax Rev.)
(suggesting that the significant purpose definition of shelters "might be broad enough
to encompass virtually any item on a corporate return that might give rise to civil or
criminal fraud scrutiny" and worrying that the privilege determination might give rise
to collateral estoppel in subsequent tax litigation).
27n See supra notes 107-18 and accompanying text.
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penalty protection defense for the new reportable transaction
understatement penalty.278 Only the opinion of an independent
advisor who merely evaluates a transaction can provide penalty
protection. 219 The elimination of penalty protection in respect of an
opinion of a tax advisor who assists with the development and
structuring of a transaction suggests that Congress viewed such an
advisor as not providing disinterested legal advice but rather
participating in the development of a business deal. Removing any
privilege from advice provided during this structuring stage would
comport with this differentiation between independent advisors and
participating advisors.
The May 2005 modifications of Circular 230 further supported
280this distinction by adding an exemption for post-return advice.
These changes suggest that Congress and Treasury view the pre-
return situation as uniquely susceptible to regulation and scrutiny.
5. Adversarial Approach to Tax Advice is Harmful
Much of the ambiguity about the proper scope for claims of
attorney-client privilege relates to the unique system of reporting and
administrative compliance checks that serves to support self-
assessment of tax liabilities within a range of acceptable conduct
tested by audits and, in some cases, through litigation. The filing of a
tax return is not the first step in an adversarial process but rather, in
most cases, a trivial event that is many steps removed from potential
litigation. The taxpayer reports its self-assessment and the
government accepts that assessment. The return becomes a point in
the data collected to monitor the system. Except for large public
companies that are constantly under audit due to the extraordinary
scope of their businesses, the filing of a return is not the automatic
start of an audit process. An audit may or may not ensue, the audit
may or may not result in the Service proposing adjustments, proposals
of adjustments may or may not be resolved through the same
cooperative process that governs the filing of return and the initial
audit requests for information, notices of deficiency may or may not
278 I.R.C. §§ 6664(d)(3)(B)(ii) (2004) (disqualified advisor rule), 6662A (new
penalty).
279 Even that opinion is subject to heightened standards for the affirmative
defense. I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2) (substantial authority and MLTN requirement, originally
part of section 6662(d)(2)(C)), (d)(3)(A)(ii) (disregard of audit lottery or settlement
possibilities), (d)(3)(B)(iii) (best practice requirements for shelter opinions).
2W See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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be issued, and a taxpayer may or may not resolve to fight a deficiency
claim through the courts. Only when taxpayers are asserting super-
aggressive positions that they expect the Service to view as abusive is
it fair to say that the filing of the tax return initiates a series of steps
that are likely to end in litigation. Even in those cases, the audit
lottery ensures that litigation remains a remote possibility and that
even flagrant disregard of the rules may go unnoticed.
In spite of the remoteness of adversarial litigation from the tax
filing stage, practitioners argue that adversarial duties attach at early
stages of the return process and courts tend to consider the audit stage
sufficiently adversarial to support evidentiary exclusion under claims
of attorney-client privilege.21 In Frederick, the court considered the
audit both a "possible antechamber to litigation" and a "stage in the
determination of tax liability," requiring a balancing of potential
fairness concerns against the Service's evidentiary needs. 2 In an
opinion that was first released with a strong rejection of privilege in
the audit context and then rewritten to provide considerable
protection of legal analysis in the audit context, the court concluded
that matters related to accounting-type tax preparation work could
not be protected (even under the new section 7525 privilege), but that
materials involving statutory or case law interpretations could be
protected from disclosure.
Proponents of interpreting the availability of privilege protection
claims to extend to audits often claim that fairness requires the
broader interpretation.8 4 These pro-privilege fairness arguments
2S Sheppard, supra note 208, at 709 (noting that "many practitioners have come
to regard return filing as adversarial [and t]hat is only one step away from the now-
accepted view of audits as adversarial").
282 United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 1999).
283 Id.
See, e.g., Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, The CPA Tax Practice
Privilege - Less Than Meets the Eye, TAX NOTES TODAY (Oct. 30, 1997) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 97 TNT 210-55) (discussing 1990 debates on
amending evidence rules to protect all tax return work, in which Sen. Symms claimed
it is "grossly unfair" that "the IRS can demand these notes and working papers to try
to outguess the taxpayer"); Sheryl Stratton, University of Chicago Conferees Take on
Privilege and Workpaper Policy, TAX NOTES TODAY (Nov. 18, 2003) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 222-6) (reporting comments by Norma
Lauder, Bank One tax director, that shorter audit cycles and routine requests for tax
accrual workpapers will be perceived negatively because "they've got your thinking"
and will not be likely to engage in substantive discussions); Andrea I. Mason,
Casenote, Counsel as Tax Preparer, An Unprivileged Position: United States v.
Frederick, 69 U. GIN. L. REv. 411 (2000) (discussing Frederick arguments).
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simply do not hold. Attorneys have always been viewed to have some
duty toward the legal system - that clients would like to encourage
the trend of elevating the fiduciary duty to client far above the
companion duty to the law is not a persuasive argument for doing so.
In fact, the fundamental compliance-enhancing purpose of the
privilege is better served in this context when clients are made more
aware of the companion duty to uphold the integrity of the legal
system. 8 ' The analogy with the adversarial process as a basis for
fairness arguments puts undue emphasis on loyalty. Similarly, basing
the fairness argument on concern about government investigative
tools overlooks the reason those tools are necessary - to give the
government some means of evaluating and assessing the actual facts
rather than merely taking the taxpayer's word for all material matters
in connection with a tax return. The government is the party at an
information disadvantage because of the asymmetries inherent in the
tax planning situation: permitting a taxpayer to use the privilege shield
to maintain that inherent disadvantage and hide improper tax
286
reporting is problematic. It encourages tax minimization social
norms that flirt with outright fraud. It may also increase taxpayer
contempt for the audit process and future noncompliance with
disclosure requirements because audits that are not based on full
disclosure of fact will inevitably be flawed.
Furthermore, the litigation of privilege issues creates a spiraling
cycle of problems that add to the inefficiency of litigation as a means
287
of resolving potential ambiguities in the tax rules. Privilege "is the
most common discovery dispute and is one of the most frequent issues
arising in civil [tax] litigation." 28  Court dockets are increasingly
285 See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate
Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1207 (2003) ("The real lesson from
the defense lawyer's or advocate's role is simply that the lawyer is... a public agent
of the legal system, whose job is to help clients steer their way through the maze of
the law, to bring clients' conduct and behavior into conformity with the law - to get
the client as much as possible of what the client wants without damaging the
framework of the law.").
286 See supra note 203 and accompanying text. "The privilege essentially protects
private communications about motives, mistakes and misfeasance in the face of a
regime created to provide access to information. Privilege thus protects what
arguably is the most important information for the Service to know and the most
difficult for it to obtain." Kayle, supra note 194, at 552.
287 See, e.g., Sheryl Stratton, Privilege Sidelines Shelter Actions, Government
Changes Tack, 100 TAX NOTES 295 (July 21, 2003) (commenting on extensive identity
privilege litigation in response to promoter investor list summonses).
28 Michael Wilson, Note, Careful What You Wish For: The Tax Practitioner-
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jammed with litigation cases, with resort to special masters to review
large sets of documents and evaluate assertions of privilege
protections. Litigation on privilege issues often becomes more
complex because of intervenors, such as tax shelter clients who want
their shelter promoters to withhold their identification from ServiceS289
requests under the list-maintenance requirements. These costs can
skyrocket in major cases with hundreds of emails and other
documents at stake.
Court expenses are not the only costs. To the extent that the
Service must resort to summonses or other processes to access
information necessary to an adequate conclusion on audit, costs of
evaluating taxpayer compliance increase and the salutary influence of
effective enforcement dwindles, leading to more noncompliance,
further privilege battles, and wasted resources. The documents most
desired to be protected will be planning documents that reveal the
way the transaction came to the taxpayer's attention, the taxpayer's
purpose for entering into the transaction, and the taxpayer's
awareness of other participants' roles (e.g., whether amounts
projected to be paid to other participants are indeed fees to
accommodation parties rather than entrepreneurial returns from a
joint venture, as claimed in the Castle Harbour transaction). Without
that evidence, the Service may be unable to prove essential elements
of its case.
Privilege disputes also draw out tax controversies and
substantially delay any court decision that ultimately may hold a
reporting position improper and assess penalties against the taxpayer
and/or advisor. The ability of court decisions to serve as bellwethers
to give taxpayers and advisors notice of the kind of tax minimization
conduct that oversteps the line is therefore substantially restrained. A
court decision's impact on the development of social norms around
tax minimization practice will likely be insubstantial when the decision
deals with activities that took place five or even ten years before the
opinion is issued. Taxpayers and practitioners can rationalize current
procedures as being based on substantially different facts or
understandings of law that were not available to the litigating
taxpayers at the time. Once again, the fundamental fairness of the tax
system is jeopardized, as aggressive taxpayers lower their tax burdens
at the cost of compliant taxpayers.
Client Privilege Established by the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform
Act of 1998, 51 FLA. L. REV. 319, 321 (1999).
289 See, e.g., United States v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6452 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2004).
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These arguments suggest, as I have proposed, that the scope of
attorney-client privilege should be significantly limited.
Communications and materials prepared in the pre-return, tax
planning stage should not be eligible for privilege protection. At
most, there are some arguments that communications during the audit
stage should be eligible for privilege protection, under the Frederick
"antechamber to litigation" approach.
6. Harms to Clients from Elimination of Privilege Overstated
The arguments for the broad scope of privilege in the tax context
rely on the basic goal of the privilege to encourage communications
290
with clients. Practitioners opposed to removal of the common law
privilege protection for all pre-return tax planning advice are likely to
claim that clients will fail to seek out advice altogether, especially in
respect of more aggressive transactions, rather than risk loss of
confidentiality.2 This argument is not convincing. For taxpayers who
enter into legitimate business transactions, the need for guidance in
structuring to avoid unnecessary tax liability will lead them to seek
help from qualified advisors. That their tax structuring discussions
may come to the Service's attention should not be a deterrent, when
the transactions arose in their business and they are in any event
required to report them on their returns. Providing a true, accurate
and complete disclosure of a transaction's impact on a reporting
position could only be seen as a detriment if a taxpayer intends to
secure an illicit tax benefit. The threat of disclosure here does no
harm. Others have noted that even in cases for which an attorney
may be required to maintain lists of clients and provide reports under
the material advisor rules, there is no reason to suppose that "a
taxpayer would be dissuaded from seeking tax advice regarding the
structuring and reporting of those transactions., 2 9 In that case, there
does not seem to be a rational basis for maintaining the privilege. The
substantial, harmful impact of withholding information, letting the
audit lottery exempt a large number of inaccurate returns, and
290 See, e.g., Kirst, supra note 266 (arguing generally for extending work product
doctrine to cover transactional work to allow attorneys to better plan for potential
litigation and to protect attorney advice from disclosure).
'9' See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157 (1993) (arguing
against three myths about need for privilege - to get clients to talk to lawyers, to get
lawyers to advise clients, and to protect lawyer-client relationship).
292 Lavoie, supra note 197, at 198.
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requiring the Service to engage in intensive investigative work in
respect of any return position that does come to its attention on audit
is not counterbalanced by any need for special encouragement to
clients to seek legal advice. In fact, it appears that the main function
of privilege in the pre-tax return context is as a cover for potentially
abusive tax advice.
A related objection is that the lack of privilege will highlight
problems on a taxpayer's return and increase the probability that a
weak position will be challenged at audit. It can be expected that the
more worried a taxpayer is about a potential challenge, the more
likely the issue will be addressed in a tax opinion. Without privilege,
the opinion will serve to flag the issue for the Service. A somewhat
flippant response to such a concern might be - so what? The self-
assessment nature of the tax system presupposes that taxpayers will
provide all information relevant to the correct assessment of their tax
liabilities. "[T]he impact of increased scrutiny is only that the correct
tax treatment of an item will be determined., 293 The taxpayer will pay
neither more nor less tax than what is actually owed. Furthermore,
penalties will not apply when a taxpayer reports properly in
accordance with the applicable standards (whether the heightened
standard proposed here or the current litigation-based standards).
7. Work Product Protection Unmerited for Pre-Return Tax Advice
The work product doctrine, developed in the seminal Hickman294
case and then incorporated in court rules, provides an evidentiary
privilege at court for materials prepared "in anticipation of litigation"
(and not some other reason).29 5 The rationale for fact and opinion
work product protection in this context is that investigative efforts and
material preparation shape the client's course of conduct throughout
the adversarial process. The existence, or imminent existence, of an
293 Id. Elimination of the privilege should therefore not increase noncompliance
even for taxpayers and tax practitioners on the fringes of ethical behavior. The
privilege is a factor that protects noncompliance by removing access to otherwise
relevant materials at the audit and litigation stages. Elimination of the privilege
should foster greater compliance in the same way that increased enforcement does.
294 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (providing work product protection
for attorney's investigation into ship's sinking, because company reasonably expected
sinking would result in litigation and wanted to timely capture information to
prepare).
295 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). The doctrine distinguishes between fact and opinion
work product, with almost absolute protection given to an attorney's opinion work
product.
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adversarial process is central. Because of the likelihood that
withholding potentially relevant information from trial could
substantially impact a trial outcome, the burden is on the party
asserting the privilege to establish its applicability. The general
interpretation is that a lawyer must have had a subjective belief that
litigation was a reasonable possibility and that belief must have been
objectively reasonable.
There are essentially two standards for the doctrine among
federal courts. Some circuits apply a narrow view of the doctrine to
tax cases, setting the timeline for protection of tax documents at the
point when litigation is reasonably anticipated or expected and the
primary purpose for the documents is to aid in possible future
296litigation. This approach rests closely on the evidentiary rules and
Hickman case.
A broader view of work product doctrine in the tax context has
emerged in other courts. In United States v. Adiman, the Second
Circuit rejected privilege claims for a lengthy legal memorandum
analyzing the tax implications of a proposed restructuring, but ruled
that work product doctrine could cover the document if it was
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prepared "because of" litigation possibilities. The Adiman test
would not protect documents prepared in the ordinary course of
business or that would have been created in the same form if there
were no prospect of litigation, but it would protect documents
prepared in connection with planned transactions if the documents
considered potential litigation strategies. Although the decision
maintains that a remote prospect of future litigation would be
insufficient, it appears under the facts of the case that the mere fact
that the memorandum considered the possibility that the
recommended position would be sustained on the merits would bring
298it into the scope of work product protection. Commentators have
seized upon this broader "because of" test for the work product
doctrine to argue that courts should embrace a new transactional
work product doctrine explicitly intended to protect the broad range
of materials produced in connection with attorney participation in
296 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981) (adopting
primary purpose test).
297 United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting Fifth
Circuit's "primarily or exclusively to assist in litigation" standard and finding that
memoranda prepared before transaction and before filing of returns could be
considered prepared in anticipation of litigation, when taxpayer was constantly under
audit and had substantial loss).
298 Id. at 1202-04 (elaborating on "because of" standard).
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transactional planning.
In line with the proposal for denying attorney-client privilege
claims to pre-return advice, the less stringent "because of" test for
work product protection should not be applied to protect pre-return
tax advice from disclosure in the course of audits or litigation.300
Ironically, the broader concept of the doctrine would almost
invariably shield from discovery most or all materials that could shed
light on the actual nature and purpose of tax-motivated transactions.
Tax-motivated planning inevitably looks forward to potential
litigation because successfully avoiding difficulties at that point is a
primary goal driving the structuring. Tax opinion letters, even those
that are specifically requested by a taxpayer to advise on what
position may be taken with respect to a tax return, are inevitably
forward-looking. Tax standards for determining what positions can be
reported are formulated in sufficiency of support and generally
understood as translating into probability assessments of success on
the merits if the position were to be litigated. The 2004 Jobs Act
provisions for the application of the affirmative defense require an
analysis that considers success on the merits without regard to the
audit lottery or settlement opportunities to avoid actual litigation.
The standards applicable to advisors are even more clearly related to
probability assessments: the "reasonable possibility of being sustained
on the merits" standard requires advisors to consider the likely course
of a position through audit and litigation.
Furthermore, conflicting pressures from the customary industry
practice of aggressive tax planning based on literalist interpretations,
the apparent condoning of that practice in the Code standards, and,
until recently, in the de minimis sanctions for violations, are at odds
with the possible application in a court of judicial doctrines that tend
to undercut literal interpretations of the Code. Because the Service
may raise specific anti-abuse provisions or broad judicial doctrines on
audit, advisors must consider the potential application of judicial
doctrines to provide a complete analysis of the applicable substantive
299 See, e.g., Kirst, supra note 266, at 273-76 (acknowledging that extraordinarily
broad work product protection in respect of "such a distant or indirect prospect of
litigation... plac[es] some strain on the language of the [evidentiary] rule," but
claiming it is justified to assure clients of protection from future litigation about
course of transaction planning).
300 As in the case of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, there is also a good
argument that the audit stage of a tax controversy should not be treated as an
adversarial process and that work product protection should not apply to any advice
prepared specifically for discussion at that stage.
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law. In fact, opinions that merely assume business purpose and pre-
tax profit potential would fail the Circular 230 covered opinion
standard. °1
Tax opinions thus focus both on statutory provisions applicable to
a contemplated transaction and on judicial doctrines that may arise in
litigation.
A tax opinion letter, sometimes called a legal opinion letter
when issued by a law firm, is intended to provide written
advice to a client on whether a particular tax product is
permissible under the law and, if challenged by the IRS, how
likely it would be that the challenged product would survive
court scrutiny. °2
The per se forward-looking nature of tax planning should not
allow those planning documents to leapfrog into work product
protection. If work product protection is extended back to the
planning stage, the basic purpose of the evidentiary privilege is lost. It
becomes merely a taxpayer cloaking device that could well prevent
the IRS from discovering almost all materials related to the reasons
that the taxpayer entered into the transaction at issue or whether
there was any economic substance to the transaction. Ironically, the
work product doctrine, if applied to tax planning advice, would tend
to be most obviously applicable to advice in respect of advisors and
taxpayers who are most aggressive in advising and engaging in
potentially abusive tax transactions, since the potential for litigation, if
discovered on audit and addressed in depth on audit, would be
substantially more certain for those transactions than for less
aggressive positions.
The rationale for work product protection, like the rationale for
the attorney-client privilege, is actually less convincing in the tax
planning context. Clients will not avoid involving tax advisors in
planning their transactions out of fear of exposing litigation strategies:
instead, their focus will be on structuring transactions so well that
litigation will not be necessary. 30 3 Nor is work product protection
301 See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(1)(ii) (unreasonable to assume business purpose or
pre-tax profit), (c)(1)(iii) (inappropriate to rely on business purpose representation if
inadequately described or advisor should know it is incorrect or incomplete).
302 SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 55.
303 Transaction structuring, in fact, pre-determines most litigation strategy. For
example, once advisors designed the Castle Harbour transaction, supra note 14, to
support an allocation of 98% of the partnership's income to the foreign bank (in spite
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needed "to prevent a litigant from taking a free ride on the research
and thinking of his opponent's lawyer."3 °4 In tax cases, the self-
assessment system and the compliance norm that supports it require
transparency about positions and reasons for failing to adopt
coherence-supporting conclusions about a particular transaction's tax
consequences. In particular, if the heightened standards for reporting
positions are adopted as recommended here, it would be
inappropriate to allow taxpayers and practitioners to stymie
enforcement by hiding behind either the attorney-client privilege or
work product protection. Failure to disclose information could
effectively hamstring the Service by making it extraordinarily difficult
for the government to demonstrate a failure to comply with
compliance norms relating to opinion giving, disclosure requirements
or substantive tax law provisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article argues that the stage is set for a paradigm shift in the
way we expect taxpayers and tax advisors to comply with tax laws.
The existing norms for tax advisors encourage zealous advocacy for
clients' positions even in nonadversarial transactional planning stages.
The general trend towards literal interpretations of statutes is
exacerbated, with many if not most tax practitioners viewing it as their
right to seek out and exploit loopholes in the way the provisions apply
to innovative structures. Because the penalty standards and ethical
standards for reporting and advising positions are based on litigation
standards, there is constant pressure to achieve tax minimization and
little pressure to get the right answer. The corporate tax shelter
regulations and the reportable transaction regime inaugurated a shift
towards greater transparency, and the 2004 Jobs Act's enactment of
stiff penalties and stiffer standards for penalty protection, at least in
the context of transactions that have a significant tax avoidance
purpose, move the target for taxpayer and advisor behavior towards
better compliance. Circular 230's significant changes to opinion
practices continue the momentum. Moving from a focus on the
"cookie cutter" tax shelters that are marketed to scores of taxpayers
to a broader focus on customized tax planning reveals a need to
of the bank's much lower capital contribution), the taxpayer had little choice at trial
not to follow the form of the transaction. See Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d
771 (3d Cir. 1967) (seminal case stating strong form of rule that taxpayer cannot
disavow the form of its transaction).
304 United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1999).
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systematize the changes already initiated and complete the shift to a
compliance expectation that undercuts the force of aggressive tax
minimization planning. Two further changes hold promise of
accomplishing the goal: to extend the MLTN substantial authority
standard to taxpayers and advisors in respect of any position and to
eliminate the application of evidentiary privileges to the pre-return
tax planning context.

